Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Bihar

6th Fl., BSBCCL Building, Hospital Road,
Shastri Nagar, Patna - 800023

No.:- RERA/REG-AGENT/MISC/10/2022-23/463 Patna, Dated:- 17/10/2023

To,
All the Real Estate Agents

Sub: Important Information for all Real Estate Agents received from the Directorate General of Audit and Indirect Taxes & Customs, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

Sir,

Please find herewith the copies ofLetters received from the Directorate General of Audit and Indirect Taxes & Customs for all Real Estate Agents who are the reporting entities under the PMLA', issued in accordance with the provisions of Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 (The Guidelines), by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA),with the instruction to follow the directions as contained in the said letters as follows:

1	Letter from Directorate General of Audit and Indirect Taxes & Customs:(copy enclosed)	'Designation of one individual and two terrorist organisations under Section 2(1) (m) and 35(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and their listing in the First and Fourth Schedule and the Act- reg.' The reporting entities, the real estate agents, are advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with persons whose Identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications & to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They are also advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.
2	Letter from Directorate General of Audit and Indirect Taxes & Customs:(copy enclosed)	'Checklist for Anti Money- Laundering/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFL) obligations checks; Terrorist financing and proliferation financing (TE/PF) checks during Audit- reg. (along with enclosures).' Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 (The Guidelines), issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA). The reporting entities, the real estate agents,are advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with persons whose Identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications & to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They are also advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.

3	Letter from Directorate General of Audit and Indirect Taxes & Customs:(copy enclosed)	'Implementation of section 51A OF UAPA, 1967: updates of UNSC's 1267/1989 ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List: 33 entries-reg.' Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 (The Guidelines), issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA). The reporting entities, the real estate agents, are advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with the persons whose Identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications and to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They are also advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.
4	Letter from the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.(copy enclosed)	'Report regarding the workshop attended on 01.11.2022 at Vigyan Bhawan New Delhi, by The Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.' Under the regulatory regime of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, (RERA), the Real Estate Agents need to be registered with the concerned Real Estate Authorities. Further Agents are mandated to maintain and preserve such books of accounts, records and documents as may be prescribed and not involvethemselves in unfair trade practices.

As such all registered Real Estate Agents whose entity is either Company/ Firm or Individual, are therefore, requested to follow all these guidelines and information.

Copy of abovementioned all letters are enclosed herewith.

This issues with the approval of the Competent Authority.

Shukla
17/10/23

Authorised Signatory

सत्यमेव जयते
Government of India

आज़ादी का अमृत महोत्सव

लेखा परीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS
C.R. BUILDING, I.P. ESTATE,
NEW DELHI-110109
दूरभाष / TEL. :011-23370075
ई-मेल / Email: dg.audit-cbec@nic.in

14.02.2023

अध्यक्ष कोषांग
49/2023
21 MAR 2023
भू-सम्पदा विनियामक प्राधिकरण
बिहार

To

1. The Chairwoman/ Chairman,
   Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
   All States & Union Territories.

2. The Principal Secretary (Housing)
   States & Union Territories.

Madam/ Sir,

Subject: Designation of one individual and two terrorist organisations under Section 2 (1) (m) and 35 (1) (a) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and their listing in the First and Fourth Schedule of the Act- reg.

Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 **(The Guidelines)**, issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA).

2. In view of Para 10 of the Guidelines, please find enclosed herewith Gazette Notifications No. 708, 709 and 717 dated 17.02.2023 (copies enclosed) in respect of the one individual and two organisations, which have been declared as "Individual Terrorists and terrorist organisations' respectively and have been listed in the First and Fourth Schedule of the UA(P) Act, 1967.

3. It is requested to forward these details to the **Real Estate Agents** who are the reporting entities under the PMLA. The reporting entities may be advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with the persons whose identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications and to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They may also be advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.

Yours faithfully,

Encls: as above

(Dr. Amandeep Singh)
Additional Director General

रजिस्ट्री सं. डी.एल.- 33004/99 REGD. No. D. L.-33004/99

भारत का राजपत्र
The Gazette of India

सी.जी.-डी.एल.-अ.-17022023-243692
CG-DL-E-17022023-243692

असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

सं. 709] नई दिल्ली, शुक्रवार, फरवरी 17, 2023/माघ 28, 1944
No. 709] NEW DELHI, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2023/MAGHA 28, 1944

गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली 17 फरवरी, 2023

का.आ. 739(अ).— विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) को व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलापों के अधिक प्रभावी निवारण करने तथा आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों से निपटने और उससे संबंधित विषयों के लिए उपबंध करने हेतु अधिनियमित किया गया है;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) और उपधारा (2), केन्द्रीय सरकार को उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में किसी व्यष्टि के नाम को जोड़ने के लिए सशक्त करता है यदि उसका यह विश्वास है कि वह आतंकवाद में सम्मिलित है;

और, हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा, पुत्र चरन सिंह संधू, निवासी ग्राम सरहाली, जिला-तरन तारन, पंजाब और ग्राम-रत्तोके, पुलिस स्टेशन चोहला साहिब, तरन तारन, पंजाब, जिसका संबंध बब्बर खालसा इंटरनेशनल (बीकेआई) से है और जो वर्तमान में सीमापार एजेंसियों के संरक्षण में लाहौर, पाकिस्तान में रह रहा है;

और, बब्बर खालसा इंटरनेशनल उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची के क्रम सं 1 पर आतंकवादी संगठन के रूप में सूचीबद्ध है;

और, उक्त हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा का पाकिस्तान स्थित आतंकवादी समूहों से सीधा संबंध है और वह बड़ी मात्रा में सीमापार से हथियारों, गोला बारुद, उग्रवादी हार्डवेयर के अतिरिक्त नशीले पदार्थों की तस्करी में भी सम्मिलित है;

और, उक्त हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा कई आंतकवादी गतिविधियों में सम्मिलित होने के अतिरिक्त पंजाब, महाराष्ट्र, हरियाणा, पश्चिमी बंगाल, हिमाचल प्रदेश, मध्य प्रदेश में विभिन्न दांडिक अपराधों जैसे हत्या, हत्या का प्रयास, ठेके पर हत्या, डकैती, जबरन वसूली आदि में सम्मिलित रहा है;

और, उक्त हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा के विरुद्ध रेड नोटिस सं. ए. 4612/6-2022 जारी किया गया है;

और केन्द्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा आतंकवाद में सम्मिलित है और, उक्त हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा को उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन आंतकवादी के रुप में जोड़ा जाना है;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, विधि विरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित संशोधन करती है अर्थात्:-

उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में, क्रम संख्यांक 53 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात्, निम्नलिखित क्रम संख्यांक और प्रविष्टियां अंतःस्थापित की जाएंगी, अर्थात्:-

"54. हरविंदर सिंह संधू उर्फ रिंदा"।

[फा. सं. 11034/09/2022/सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ठ, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण : विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की चौथी अनुसूची का अंतिम बार संशोधन अधिसूचना संख्यांक का.आ. 105(अ) तारीख 9 जनवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 17th February, 2023.

S.O. 739(E).—Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 35 of the said Act empowers the Central Government to add the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, if it believes that he is involved in terrorism;

And whereas, Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda, son of Charan Singh Sandhu, resident of Village- Sarhali, District-Tarn Taran, Punjab and Village- Rattoke, Police Station-Chohla Sahib, Tarn Taran, Punjab, is associated with Babbar Khalsa International(BKI) and is presently based in Lahore, Pakistan under the patronage of cross border agencies;

And whereas, Babbar Khalsa International is listed as a terrorist organisation at serial No. 1 of the First Schedule to the said Act;

And whereas, the said Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda has direct links with Pakistan based terrorist groups and is also involved in cross border smuggling of arms, ammunition, militant hardware besides drugs in large scale;

And whereas, the said Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda remained involved in various criminal offences like murder, attempt to murder, contract killing, robbery, extortion, etc. in the States of Punjab, Maharashtra, Haryana, West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh besides being involved in several terrorist activities;

And whereas, Red Notice No., A-4612/6-2022 has been issued against Harwinder Singh sandhu @Rinda;

And whereas, the Central Government believes that Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda is involved in terrorism and the said Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda is to be added as a terrorist under the said Act;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 53 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"54. Harwinder Singh Sandhu @Rinda".

[F. No. 11034/09/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note : The Fourth Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended *vide* the notification number S.O. 105 (E), dated the 9th January, 2023.

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असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
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सं. 717] नई दिल्ली, शुक्रवार, फरवरी 17, 2023/माघ 28, 1944
No. 717] NEW DELHI, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2023/MAGHA 28, 1944

गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली 17 फरवरी, 2023

का.आ. 747(अ).—विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलापों के अधिक प्रभावी निवारण और आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों से निपटने लिए और उससे संबंधित विषयों के लिए उपबंध करने हेतु अधिनियमित किया गया है;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 2 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (ड) के अनुसार "आतंकवादी संगठन" से उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में सूचीबद्ध संगठन या इस प्रकार सूचीबद्ध संगठन के रूप में सामान नाम के अधीन क्रियाशील संगठन अभिप्रेत है;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में इस प्रकार के आतंकवादी संगठनों की सूची अंतर्विष्ट है ;

और, "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)", इस अधिनियम के अधीन विहित आतंकवादी संगठन बब्बर खालसा इंटरनेशनल की शाखा के रूप में वर्ष 2011 में अस्तित्व में आया था;

और, "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" एक उग्रवादी आँउटफिट है और उसका उद्देश्य पृथक् "खालिस्तान" राज्य की विनिर्मिती के उसके एजेंडे को प्राप्त करने की दृष्टि से पंजाब में आतंकवाद को पुनर्जीवित करना है और इस प्रकार भारत की राज्यक्षेत्रीय अखंडता, एकता, राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा और संप्रभुता को चुनौती देना है;

और, "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों की अभिवृद्धि करता है और अन्वेषण अभिकरणों ने लक्षित हत्याओं सहित आतंकवाद के विभिन्न मामलों में उसके काडर की संलिप्तता पाई है;

और, भारत में "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" के सदस्य उनके विदेश आधारित संचालकों से उन्नत हथियारों सहित वित्तीय और रसद सहायता प्राप्त कर रहे हैं;

और, "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" का वर्तमान प्रचालन प्रमुख हरदीप सिंह निज्जर उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन "आतंकवादी" के रूप में अभिहित किया गया है;

और, अन्वेषण अभिकरणों ने विभिन्न आतंकवादी मामलों और प्रमुख व्यक्तियों की हत्याओं में "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" के काडरों की संलिप्तता पाई है;

और, केन्द्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि "खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ)" आतंकवाद में संलिप्त है और उसने भारत में आतंकवाद के विभिन्न कृत्यों में भाग लिया है;

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार, विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित और संशोधन करती है, अर्थात् :-

उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में क्रम संख्यांक 43 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात् निम्नलिखित क्रम संख्यांक और प्रविष्टियां अंतःस्थापित की जाएगी, अर्थात् :-

"44. खालिस्तान टाईगर फोर्स (केटीएफ) और उसके सभी रूप और फ्रंट संगठन"।

[फा. सं. 11034/07/2022/सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ठ, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण : विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की पहली अनुसूची का अंतिम संशोधन अधिसूचना सं. का.आ. 738 (अ), तारीख 17 फरवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 17th February, 2023.

S.O. 747(E).—Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, as per clause (m) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the said Act, 'terrorist organisation' means an organisation listed in the First Schedule to the said Act or an organisation operating under the same name as an organisation so listed;

And whereas, the First Schedule to the said Act contains the list of such terrorist organisations;

And whereas, the 'Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF)' came into existence in the year 2011 as an offshoot of Babbar Khalsa International, a proscribed terrorist organisation under the said Act;

And whereas, 'Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF)' is a militant outfit and it aims reviving terrorism in Punjab with a view to achieve its agenda of formation of a separate state 'Khalistan' and thereby challenges the territorial integrity, unity, national security and sovereignty of India;

And whereas, the 'Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF)' promotes acts of terrorism and the investigation agencies have found involvement of its cadres in various terrorist cases, including targeted killings;

And whereas, the members of the 'Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF)' in India are receiving financial and logistics support including sophisticated weaponry from their foreign based handlers;

And whereas, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, the current Operational Chief of Khalistan Tiger Force has been designated as 'Terrorist' under the said Act;

And whereas, the investigation agencies have found involvement of cadres of Khalistan Tiger Force in various terrorist cases and assassination of prominent persons;

And whereas, the Central Government believes that the 'Khalistan Tiger Force' is involved in terrorism and it has committed and participated in various acts of terrorism in India;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following further amendments in the First Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the First Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 43 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"44. Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF) and all its manifestations and front organisations."

[F. No. 11034/07/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note : The First Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended vide the notification number S.O.738(E)., dated the 17th February, 2023.

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रजिस्ट्री सं. डी.एल.- 33004/99 REGD. No. D. L.-33004/99

भारत का राजपत्र
The Gazette of India

सी.जी.-डी.एल.-अ.-17022023-243691
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असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

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No. 708] NEW DELHI, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2023/MAGHA 28, 1944

गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली 17 फरवरी, 2023

का.आ. 738(अ).—विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) को व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलापों के अधिक प्रभावी निवारण तथा आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों से निपटने के लिए और उससे संबंधित विषयों के लिए उपबंध करने हेतु अधिनियमित किया गया है;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 2 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (ड) के अनुसार, 'आतंकवादी संगठन' से उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में सूचीबद्ध संगठन या इस प्रकार से सूचीबद्ध संगठन के रूप में समान नाम के अधीन क्रियाशील संगठन अभिप्रेत है;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में इस प्रकार के आतंकवादी संगठनों की सूची अंतर्विष्ट है;

और, 'जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ)' वर्ष 2020 में एक आतंकवादी संगठन के रूप में सामने आया और यह लश्कर-ए-तैयबा, जैश-ए-मोहम्मद, तहरीक-उल-मुजाहिदीन, हरकत-उल-जिहाद-ए-इस्लामी आदि जैसे विभिन्न प्रतिबंधित आतंकवादी संगठनों से अपने काडरों को बनाता है;

और, जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ), संघ राज्यक्षेत्र जम्मू-कश्मीर में घुसपैठ की कोशिशों, नशीले पदार्थों और हथियारों की तस्करी और आतंकवादी हमलों को अंजाम देने में शामिल है;

और, जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ) नियमित रूप से भारतीय सुरक्षा बलों को धमकियां देता है और संघ राज्यक्षेत्र जम्मू-कश्मीर के लोगों को विभिन्न सोशल मीडिया प्लेटफार्म का उपयोग कर भारत के खिलाफ आतंकवादी संगठनों में शामिल होने के लिए, उकसाता है;

और, जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ) की गतिविधियां भारत की राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा और संप्रभुता के लिए हानिकारक है;

और, केंद्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ) आतंकवाद में संलिप्त है और यह भारत में आतंकवाद के विभिन्न कृत्यों में भाग लेता रहता है;

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार, विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित और संशोधन करती है, अर्थात् :--

उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची में क्रम संख्यांक 42 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात्, निम्नलिखित क्रम संख्यांक और प्रविष्टियां अंतःस्थापित की जाएगी, अर्थात् :-

"43. जम्मू और कश्मीर गजनवी फोर्स (जेकेजीएफ) और इसके सभी रूप और फ्रंट संगठन ।"।

[फा. सं. 11034/16/2022-सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ठ, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण : विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की पहली अनुसूची का अंतिम संशोधन अधिसूचना संख्यांक का.आ. 85 (अ), तारीख 6 जनवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 17th February, 2023.

S.O. 738(E).—Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, as per clause (m) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the said Act, 'terrorist organisation' means an organisation listed in the First Schedule to the said Act or an organisation operating under the same name as an organisation so listed;

And whereas, the First Schedule to the said Act contains the list of such terrorist organisations;

And whereas, 'Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF)' surfaced in the year 2020 as a terrorist outfit and it draws its cadres from various proscribed terrorist organisations, such as Lashker-E-Taiba, Jaish-E-Mohammed, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul—Jehad-E-Islami, etc.;

And whereas, the 'Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF)' is involved in infiltration bids, narcotics and weapon smuggling and carrying out terror attacks in the Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir;

And whereas, the 'Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF)' regularly issues threats to Indian Security Forces and uses various social media platforms for inciting people of Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir to join terrorist outfits against India;

And whereas, the activities of 'Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF)' are detrimental to the national security and sovereignty of India;

And whereas, Central Government believes that the 'Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF)' is involved in terrorism and it has committed and participated in various acts of terrorism in India;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following further amendments in the First Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the First Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 42 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"43. Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force (JKGF) and all its manifestations and front organisations."

[F. No. 11034/16/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note : The First Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended *vide* the notification number S.O. 85 (E), dated the 6th January, 2023.

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DGA/Tech/Misc/26/2022-TECH-O/o DG-DGA-HQ-DELHI

I/1116358/2023

सत्यमेव जयते

Government of India

आज़ादी का अमृत महोत्सव

लेखा परीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS
C.R. BUILDING, I.P. ESTATE,
NEW DELHI-110109
दूरभाष / TEL. :011-23370075
ई-मेल / Email: dg.audit-cbec@nic.in

06.04.2023

62/2023
13 APR 2023
बिहार
भू-सम्पदा विनियामक प्राधिकरण

To

1. The Chairwoman/ Chairman,
Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
All States & Union Territories.

2. The Commissioner,
SGST (All)

3. The Principal Director General,
DGGI Headquarters

4. The Pr.Additional Director General/ Additional Director General,
Zonal Units of DG Audit (All).

5.The Principal Commissioner/ Commissioner,
CGST Audit Commissionerate (All)

Madam/ Sir,

Subject: Checklist for Anti Money-Laundering/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations checks; Terrorist financing and proliferation financing (TF/PF) checks during Audit- reg.

Please refer to the 'Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002' dated 17.02.2023 issued by DG Audit as Regulator under PMLA (copy enclosed).

2. It has been requested that during audit/ investigation of taxpayers, who are providing services as real estate agents and having annual turnover of Rupees twenty lakhs, the fulfilment of obligations and adherence to the procedures prescribed in the guidelines by the reporting entities may be ensured.

3. In this regard, please find enclosed a Checklist for ensuring Anti Money-Laundering/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations; Terrorist financing and proliferation financing (TF/PF) by the reporting entities during Audit/ investigation.

4. It may also please be ensured that all reporting entities under PMLA are registered with respective Real Estate Regulatory Authority.

Encls: as above

Yours faithfully,

Seema Arora

(Seema Arora)
Pr. Director General

DGA/Tech/REF/1/2023-TECH-O/o DG-DGA-HQ-DELHI

सत्यमेव जयते
Government of India

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06.04.2023

To

1. The Chairwoman/ Chairman,
   Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
   All States & Union Territories.

2. The Principal Secretary (Housing)
   States & Union Territories.

Madam/ Sir,

Subject: Security Council ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends 102 Entries on Its Sanctions List - reg.

Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities **(Real Estate Agents)** under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 (The Guidelines), issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA).

2. In view of Para 10 of the Guidelines, please find below mentioned **102 entries** which have been amended on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2610 (2021) following the 2021 Annual Review conducted in accordance with paragraphs 90 and 91 of resolution 2610 (2021). The following technical amendments were implemented on all the entries below:

1. QDi.001	36. QDi.236	71. QDi.405
2. QDi.002	37. QDi.238	72. QDi.406
3. QDi.009	38. QDi.249	73. QDi.407
4. QDi.017	39. QDi.264	74. QDi.408
5. QDi.018	40. QDi.265	75. QDi.409
6. QDi.019	41. QDi.266	76. QDi.410
7. QDi.054	42. QDi.271	77. QDi.415
8. QDi.055	43. QDi.272	78. QDi.424
9. QDi.056	44. QDi.273	79. QDe.003
10. QDi.058	45. QDi.276	80. QDe.012

11. QDi.075	46. QDi.277	81. QDe.015
12. QDi.087	47. QDi.283	82. QDe.021
13. QDi.114	48. QDi.289	83. QDe.100
14. QDi.119	49. QDi.291	84. QDe.104
15. QDi.122	50. QDi.296	85. QDe.105
16. QDi.123	51. QDi.308	86. QDe.106
17. QDi.124	52. QDi.309	87. QDe.108
18. QDi.129	53. QDi.312	88. QDe.109
19. QDi.136	54. QDi.313	89. QDe.110
20. QDi.142	55. QDi.314	90. QDe.111
21. QDi.144	56. QDi.315	91. QDe.112
22. QDi.147	57. QDi.316	92. QDe.113
23. QDi.156	58. QDi.317	93. QDe.114
24. QDi.186	59. QDi.318	94. QDe.116
25. QDi.188	60. QDi.319	95. QDe.121
26. QDi.196	61. QDi.320	96. QDe.135
27. QDi.203	62. QDi.335	97. QDe.136
28. QDi.204	63. QDi.361	98. QDe.152
29. QDi.216	64. QDi.374	99. QDe.153
30. QDi.218	65. QDi.380	100. QDe.154
31. QDi.223	66. QDi.392	101. QDe.155
32. QDi.228	67. QDi.399	102. QDe.156
33. QDi.229	68. QDi.400	
34. QDi.231	69. QDi.403	
35. QDi.232	70. QDi.404	

3. The details of aforesaid individuals and entities along-with the narrative summaries of reasons for listing of the above entry are accessible on the U.N. website following URL:

[http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries | www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries].

4. Press release regarding the above can be found at
[https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15229.doc.htm |
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15229.doc.htm]

5. The UNSC press releases concerning amendments to the list are available at URL:

[https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/press-releases | https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/press-releases]

6. The latest versions of the Sanctions lists are accessible on the UN Security Council's website at the following URL:

a) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1989 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida [http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list | www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list]

b) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to Taliban [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials | https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials]

7. This information is being issued in pursuance of the instructions contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India' order F.No. 14014/01/2019/CFT, dated 2 February 2021, regarding the Procedure for implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

8. It is requested to forward these details to the **Real Estate Agents** who are the reporting entities under the PMLA. The reporting entities may be advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with the persons whose identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications and to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They may also be advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.

9. A soft copy of the letter is enclosed for ease of access of the above mentioned links.

Yours faithfully,

Encls: as above

(Dr. Amandeep Singh)
Additional Director General

SECRET

DGA/Tech/REF/1/2023-TECH-O/o DG-DGA-HQ-DELHI

सत्यमेव जयते
Government of India

आज़ादी का अमृत महोत्सव

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06.04.2023

To

1. The Chairwoman/ Chairman,
   Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
   All States & Union Territories.

2. The Principal Secretary (Housing)
   States & Union Territories.

Madam/ Sir,

Subject: Security Council ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends 102 Entries on Its Sanctions List - reg.

Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities **(Real Estate Agents)** under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.02.2023 (The Guidelines), issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA).

2. In view of Para 10 of the Guidelines, please find below mentioned **102 entries** which have been amended on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2610 (2021) following the 2021 Annual Review conducted in accordance with paragraphs 90 and 91 of resolution 2610 (2021). The following technical amendments were implemented on all the entries below:

1. QDi.001	36. QDi.236	71. QDi.405
2. QDi.002	37. QDi.238	72. QDi.406
3. QDi.009	38. QDi.249	73. QDi.407
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7. QDi.054	42. QDi.271	77. QDi.415
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15. QDi.122	50. QDi.296	85. QDe.105
16. QDi.123	51. QDi.308	86. QDe.106
17. QDi.124	52. QDi.309	87. QDe.108
18. QDi.129	53. QDi.312	88. QDe.109
19. QDi.136	54. QDi.313	89. QDe.110
20. QDi.142	55. QDi.314	90. QDe.111
21. QDi.144	56. QDi.315	91. QDe.112
22. QDi.147	57. QDi.316	92. QDe.113
23. QDi.156	58. QDi.317	93. QDe.114
24. QDi.186	59. QDi.318	94. QDe.116
25. QDi.188	60. QDi.319	95. QDe.121
26. QDi.196	61. QDi.320	96. QDe.135
27. QDi.203	62. QDi.335	97. QDe.136
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a) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1989 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida [http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list | www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list]

b) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to Taliban [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials | https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials]

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9. A soft copy of the letter is enclosed for ease of access of the above mentioned links.

Yours faithfully,

Encls: as above

(Dr. Amandeep Singh)
Additional Director General

DGA/Tech/Misc/26/2022-TECH-O/o DG-DGA-HQ-DELHI

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Government of India

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AML & CFT GUIDELINES FOR REAL ESTATE AGENTS, 2023

Subject: Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) - Obligations for Real Estate Agents under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Rules made thereunder

1. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 ("PMLA") was brought into force with effect from 1st July 2005. Necessary Notifications/Rules under the said Act were published in the Gazette of India on July 01, 2005 by the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

2. As per the provisions of the PMLA, all Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), which includes the Real Estate Agents (REAs), shall have to adhere to client account opening procedures and maintain records of such transactions as prescribed by the PMLA and rules notified thereunder.

3. The DNFBPs shall also be required to report the specified transactions, including the suspicious transactions with a view to provide deterrence to the money-laundering and financing of terrorism.

4. In view of the Risk Based Approach (RBA) adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for real estate agents and the recommendations made by it, these guidelines in the context of existing anti-money laundering law in the country, viz, the PMLA and the rules made thereunder have been issued for the REAs, who are referred to as the Reporting Entities for the purposes of

these guidelines. The guidelines provide an overview on the background and essential principles that concern combating Money Laundering (ML) and Terrorist Financing (TF) as well as a detailed account of the procedures and obligations to be followed by all reporting entities to ensure compliance with AML/CFT provisions.

5. These Guidelines have been issued in supersession of the earlier Guidelines issued on 30.12.2022.

Yours faithfully,

(Dr. Amandeep Singh)
Additional Director General

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INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Table of contents:

Section: A

1. Introduction
2. Purpose of the guidelines
3. Real Estate Agents
4. Policies and Procedures to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist financing
5. Obligation to establish policies & procedures under PMLA

Section: B

6. Detailed Guidelines on Anti Money-Laundering and combating the financing of terrorism Procedures
7. Liability for failure to fulfil obligations
8. Illustrative list of documents required for KYC
9. Maintenance of records of transactions/ Information to be recorded/Preservation of records/ Cash and Suspicious transactions reporting to Financial Intelligence Unit-India (FIU-IND)
10. Implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)
11. Recruitment and training of employees
12. Definitions

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INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

Section: A

1. Introduction:

1.1 These guidelines shall be called the **Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002** (hereafter called **"The Guidelines")**.The Guidelines aim to provide a general background and summary of the provisions of the applicable anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing legislations in India, viz. the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the "**PMLA**") and the Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the "**PMLR**") and their applicability to and implications for the real estate agents in applying certain Anti Money Laundering/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations.

1.2 Rule 2(1)(fa)(iv) of the PMLR defines 'Regulator' as "the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, constituted under Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963, with respect to the real estate agents" (inserted vide G.S.R. Notification 800(E) dated 28.12.2020 issued under F.No. P-12011/14/2020-ES Cell-DOR. The Guidelines are being issued by the Directorate General of Audit (DGA), Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) which has been appointed Regulator on behalf of Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India for this purpose vide O.M. dated 22.11.2021 of the Commissioner (GST-Inv), CBIC **(Annexure-I)**. The broader context for the Guidelines is provided by the Recommendations made by Financial Action Task force (FATF) on anti-money laundering standards and the Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach adopted in its June 2008 Plenary to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which includes guidance for public authorities and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) including Real Estate Agents (hereinafter also referred to as the "Reporting Entities"), amongst others.

1.3 The PMLA and the rules made thereunder, viz. the PMLR, on implementing a risk-based approach for the Reporting Entities, lays down the principles to be followed by them and highlights risk factors specific to those DNFBPs, along with suggestions to minimize the risk of Money Laundering/ Terrorist Financing (ML/TF).

1.4 These guidelines also set out the steps that a Real Estate Agent shall implement to discourage and to identify any money laundering or terrorist financing activities. These guidelines prescribe procedures and obligations to be followed by the reporting entities to ensure compliance with Anti Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) guidelines.

1.5 The strategies to manage and mitigate the identified money laundering and terrorist financing activities are typically aimed at preventing the activity from occurring through a mixture of deterrence [*e.g.,* appropriate Client Due Diligence ("**CDD**") measures], detection (*e.g.,* monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting), and record-keeping so as to facilitate investigations by the appropriate authorities, wherever required, which are discussed at length here under.

2. Purpose of the guidelines:

2.1 The purpose of these guidelines is to explain the risk-based approach, outline the core principles involved in applying the same, and indicate best practices in the design and implementation of an effective risk-based approach.

2.2 The purpose of these guidelines is also to establish a reporting mechanism with the real estate agents that will help in combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

3. Real Estate Agents

For purposes of these guidelines, the term "real estate agents" has the same meaning as defined in Clause (zm) of Section 2 of The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 ('**RERA**'). "Real estate agent" means 'any person, who negotiates or acts on behalf of one person in a transaction of transfer of his plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, in a real estate project, by way of sale, with another person or transfer of plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, of any other person to him and receives remuneration or fees or any other charges for his services whether as a commission or otherwise and includes a person who introduces, through any medium, prospective buyers and sellers to each other for negotiation for sale or purchase of plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, and includes property dealers, brokers, middlemen by whatever name called and **having annual turnover of Rupees twenty lakhs and above**.'

4. Policies and Procedures to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist financing: (AML/ CFT Program):

4.1. Every real estate agent is required to have an AML/ CFT program in place in order to discharge its statutory responsibility to detect possible attempts of money laundering and financing of terrorism.

4.2. In view of the requirements of the PMLA and the rules made thereunder, as applicable to the reporting entities in preventing ML and TF, each real estate agent shall consider carefully the specific nature of its business, organisational structure, type of client and transaction, etc to satisfy itself that the measures taken by it are adequate and appropriate and follow the spirit of the suggested measures as laid down in the PMLA. Each reporting entity shall also satisfy itself that such measures are effectively implemented.

4.3 Real Estate offers a convenient way to launder large amounts in a single transaction. Real Estate also offers secondary benefits for the criminals, such as helping them to secure residence, ensuring social respectability, and providing an immediately available good of material benefit. As such, criminals may not make any tangible use of many financial assets, but such is not the case with real estate sector as it offers opportunity to individuals to transfer the value of funds into both commercial and residential property. Real estate is often an appreciating asset that can generate returns and become a good source of personal gains. A real estate agent must be able to form a reasonable belief that they know the true identity of each customer. Customer Due Diligence (CDD) measures must be conducted to form these beliefs with the identification and verification of the identity of customers and their beneficial owners.

5. Obligation to establish policies and procedures under PMLA:

5.1 In order to combat the menace of money-laundering, terror financing and other related serious crimes, Rule 7(3) of the PMLR casts an obligation on every reporting entity to evolve an internal mechanism in respect of these guidelines to detect transactions as specified under Rule 3(1) and furnishing information about such transactions to Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-IND). The obligation of reporting entities to effectively serve to prevent and impede money laundering and terrorist financing and to observe such internal controls not only by them but also by their designated Director, officers and employees is a legal requirement under Rule 7(4) of the PMLR. It is without ambiguity that the success of internal policies and procedures will be dependent largely on how effectively these are outlined and implemented.

5.2 To comply with these obligations, every reporting entity shall establish appropriate policies and procedures for the prevention of ML and TF and ensure their effectiveness and compliance with all relevant legal and regulatory requirements. The reporting entities shall:

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लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

(i) issue a statement of policies and procedures for dealing with ML and TF reflecting the current statutory and regulatory requirements;

(ii) ensure that spirit of these guidelines and internal policies and procedures are understood by all staff members;

(iii) regularly review the policies and procedures on the prevention of ML and TF to ensure their effectiveness. To ensure the effectiveness of policies and procedures, the person doing such a review shall, as far as possible, be different from the one who has framed them;

(iv) adopt client acceptance policies and procedures and undertake Client Due Diligence (CDD) measures to the extent that is sensitive to the risk of ML and TF depending on the type of client, business relationship or transaction;

(v) have a system in place for identifying, monitoring and reporting suspected ML or TF transactions to the law enforcement authorities; and

(vi) develop mechanism/s through training/ workshops, etc to make their staff aware and vigilant to guard against ML and TF.

5.3 **Maintenance of records:** As per the provisions of Section 12 of the PMLA, every reporting entity shall have to maintain a record of all the transactions; information relating to such transactions, whether attempted or executed, the nature and value of which has been prescribed in Rule 3 of the PMLR and to maintain record of documents evidencing identity of its clients and beneficial owners as well as account files and business correspondence relating to its clients as detailed in the foregoing part of these guidelines.

5.4 **Transactions defined for the purpose of reporting:** As prescribed under Rule 3 of the PMLR, such transactions include:

(i) All **cash** transactions of the value of more than Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency.

(ii) All series of **cash** transactions integrally connected to each other which have been individually valued below Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency where such series of transactions have taken place within a month and the monthly aggregate exceeds an amount of Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency.

(iii) All **cash** transactions where forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes have been used as genuine or where any forgery of a valuable security or a document has taken place facilitating the transactions.

(iv) All suspicious transactions **whether or not made in cash** and by way of deposits or credits, as provided under sub rule 1(D) of Rule 3 of the said rules.

It is, however, clarified that for the purpose of suspicious transactions reporting, apart from 'transactions integrally connected', 'transactions remotely connected or related' shall also be considered.

5.5 **Know Your Client (KYC) and Client Due Diligence (CDD):** As provided under Section 11A of the PMLA read with Rule 9 of the PMLR, it is incumbent upon every Reporting Entity to follow certain client identification procedures in respect of the buyers and sellers of real estate and monitoring transactions of a suspicious nature for the purpose of reporting it to the appropriate authority. These 'Know Your Client' guidelines have been revisited in the context of the Recommendations made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Anti Money Laundering (AML) standards and on Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The reporting entities are advised to ensure that an appropriate policy framework on 'Know Your

Client' and Anti Money-Laundering measures is formulated and put in place. Principally, these CDD measures are required to be followed when the Reporting Entities engage in any cash transaction with a client equal to or **exceeding rupees fifty thousand**, as prescribed under Rule 9(1)(b)(i) of the PMLR.

5.6 **Suspicious Transaction Reporting:** In line with FATF Recommendation 20, Rule 8(2) read with Rule 3(1)(D) of the PMLR provides for prompt reporting of a suspicious transaction, which includes an attempted suspicious transaction, to the FIU-IND, if a reporting entity suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds used by a client are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing. A suspicious transaction shall be reported within **seven** working days of its occurrence.

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लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

Section: B

6. Detailed Guidelines on Anti Money-Laundering and combating the financing of terrorism Procedures

6.1 Appointment of a Designated Director and a Principal Officer:

In line with the provisions of Rule 7 of the PMLR, every reporting entity shall appoint:

(i) a Principal Officer and,

(ii) a Designated Director

As far as possible, the Principal Officer and the Designated Director should be separate individuals. Names, designation, telephone number and addresses (email addresses) of Principal Officer and the Designated Director including any changes therein shall be intimated to the Office of the Director, FIU-IND, Regulator and the Real Estate Regulatory Authority governing the reporting entity.

6.1.1 The Designated Director and the Principal Officer shall be responsible for the following to combat money laundering/ countering the financing of terrorism:

(a) Furnishing of the information under Rule 8 (1) of the PMLR, as prescribed under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said rules on monthly basis, **by 15th day of the succeeding month,** in prescribed **Format** to the Director, FIU-IND. However, the information in respect of a suspicious transaction shall be furnished **within seven working days** of its occurrence as per Rule 8(2) of the PMLR, as mentioned at Para 8.6. Such information shall include any attempted transactions, whether or not made in cash;

(b) Evolving an internal mechanism with regard to any guidelines issued by the Regulator or the Director, FIU-IND and for furnishing information as prescribed under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the PMLR;

(c) Communication of group policies relating to prevention of ML and TF to all management and relevant staff that handle account information, money and client records, etc. within their organisation;

(d) Client acceptance policy and client due diligence measures, including requirements for proper identification, such as:

  (i) Maintenance of records;

  (ii) Compliance with relevant statutory and regulatory requirements;

  (iii) Cooperation with the relevant law enforcement authorities, including the timely disclosure of information; and

  (iv) Role of internal audit or compliance function to ensure compliance with the policies, procedures and controls relating to the prevention of ML and TF, including detection of suspected money laundering transactions.

6.2 Client Due Diligence (CDD) Measures and Know Your Client (KYC) norms:

6.2.1. In consonance with the basic principles of the KYC norms as prescribed in the PMLA or the rules made there under, all reporting entities shall frame their own internal directives based on their experience in dealing with their clients and legal requirements as per the established practices.

6.2.2. In accordance with Rule 9 of the PMLR, each reporting entity shall adopt written procedures to implement the anti-money laundering provisions as envisaged under the PMLA, related to the **'Client Due Diligence Process'**. The requirement is stated hereunder:

लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

1. Every reporting entity shall-

(a) at the time of commencement of an account-based relationship-

(i) identify its clients, verify their identity, obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; and

(ii) determine whether a client is acting on behalf of a beneficial owner, and identify, the beneficial owner and take all steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner:

(b) in all other cases, verify identity while carrying out-

(i) transaction of an amount equal to or exceeding rupees fifty thousand, whether conducted as a single transaction or several transactions that appear to be connected, as mentioned at Para 8.5 above.

2. Every reporting entity shall be responsible for obtaining KYC records of its clients and file the same with the Central KYC Records Registry. The third-party KYC records may also be used for this purpose.

6.2.3. Considering the potential threat of transactions in real estate by a money launderer / terrorism financier, the reporting entities should make reasonable efforts to determine the true identity of all clients engaging in sale and purchase of such real estate, especially the person who funds/pays for a transaction, either as beneficial owner or otherwise. Where a client is a juridical person, verification of identity is required to be carried out on persons purporting to act and are authorised to act on behalf of a client. Effective procedures should be put in place to obtain requisite details for proper identification of new clients. Special care has to be exercised to ensure that the transactions are not under anonymous or fictitious names.

6.3. **Beneficial owners:** The reporting entities should also make reasonable efforts to obtain sufficient information in order to identify persons who are the beneficial owners. Whenever it is apparent that the transactions made through an account are beneficially owned by a party other than the client, that party shall be identified using client identification and verification procedures. The beneficial owner is the natural person or persons who ultimately own, control or influence a client and/or persons on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement. The client's identity should be verified using reliable, independent source documents, data or information.

6.4. **Enhanced Due Diligence:**

6.4.1. In tune with the FATF Recommendation 19, Section 12AA of the PMLA prescribes for the reporting entities to perform enhanced due diligence for higher-risk clients, business relationships and transactions. Recommendation 12, which prescribes measures to be taken for Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), provides for additional measures for specific clients and activities, which are considered to be a higher risk scenario requiring enhanced CDD. Politically exposed persons are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, e.g., Heads of States or of Governments, senior politicians, senior government/judicial/military officers, senior executives of state-owned corporations, important political party officials.

6.4.2. Reporting entities should examine, as far as reasonably possible, the background and purpose of all complex, unusually large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. Where the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing are higher, reporting entities should be required to conduct enhanced due diligence measures, consistent with the risks identified. In particular, they should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious.

6.4.3 Conducting enhanced due diligence should not be limited to merely documenting income proofs. They should be more rigorous and robust measures than normal KYC. These measures should be commensurate with the risk. While it is not intended to be exhaustive, the following are some of the reasonable measures in carrying out enhanced due diligence:

(i) More frequent review of the clients' profile/transactions,

(ii) Application of additional measures like gathering information from publicly available sources or otherwise,

(iii) Review of the clients' information at senior level of the reporting entity,

(iv) Reasonable measures to know the client's source of funds commensurate with the assessed risk of client and product profile which may include:

(a) conducting independent enquiries on the details collected on / provided by the client where required,

(b) consulting a credible database, public or other, etc.

लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

6.5. **Policy for client acceptance and risk assessment (Risk Based Approach):**

6.5.1. Within the provisions of Rule 9 of the PMLR, the KYC policy shall clearly spell out the client identification procedure to be carried out at different stages, i.e., while establishing the relationship with client, while carrying out transactions with a client or when the reporting entity has doubts regarding the veracity or the adequacy of previously obtained client identification data.

6.5.2. It is generally recognized that certain clients may be of a higher or lower risk category depending on the circumstances such as the client's background, type of business relationship or transaction, etc. In order to identify the types of clients that are likely to pose a higher than average risk of ML or TF, the reporting entities shall develop client acceptance policies and procedures. It would help in applying client due diligence on a risk sensitive basis. The risk assessment shall be documented and shall be made available to the Director, FIU-IND/ Regulator, as and when required. The following safeguards are to be followed while accepting the clients:

a) No reporting entity shall allow the opening of or keep any anonymous account or account in fictitious names or accounts on behalf of other persons whose identity has not been disclosed or cannot be verified.
b) The clients should be categorised in two categories, viz. high risk and low risk.
c) Factors of risk perception for monitoring suspicious transactions of the clients are clearly defined having regard to clients' location, nature of business activity, trading turnover etc. and manner of making payment for transactions

undertaken.

d) Individuals (other than High Net Worth) and entities whose identities and sources of wealth can be easily identified and transactions in whose accounts by and large conform to the known profile may be categorised as low risk. The salaried employees whose salary structures are well defined, people belonging to lower economic strata of the society, government departments and government owned companies, regulators and statutory bodies may fall under the low-risk category. In such cases, the basic requirements of verifying the identity and location of the client need to be ensured and a simplified client due diligence process should be followed. However, in case a client's profile is found to be inconsistent with his transactions, an enhanced due diligence may be resorted to.

e) A risk assessment of clients who are non-residents, high net worth individuals, trusts, charities, NGOs and organisations receiving donations, companies having close family shareholding or beneficial ownership, firms with sleeping partners etc will determine their Money Laundering/ Terrorist Financing risk.

f) Individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, e.g., Heads of States or of Governments, senior politicians, senior government/judicial/military officers, senior executives of state-owned corporations, important political party officials, are higher risk clients and reporting entities should conduct enhanced due diligence of such individuals and their close relatives. All reporting entities shall put in place appropriate risk management systems to obtain relevant information about such clients, such as referring to publicly available information. Approval at senior management level must be required for establishing business relationships with such clients. Reporting entities shall also take reasonable measures to verify the sources of funds as well as the wealth of such clients.

g) The clients with dubious reputation as per available public information are considered as high risk, requiring EDD.

h) In cases where the appropriate CDD measures to identify the profile of a client cannot be applied or it is not possible to ascertain the identity of the client, or the information provided by the client is suspected to be false or non–genuine, the reporting entity shall not enter into a transaction with such client. In such cases, a suspicious activity report shall be filed.

i) In cases, where the identity of a client is ascertained as having a criminal background, a suspicious transaction report shall be filed.

6.6. Reliance on Third Party KYC:

The reporting entity is solely responsible for undertaking Client Due Diligence and Enhanced Due Diligence measures. However, subject to the provisions of Rule 9(2) of the PML (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005, a reporting entity may rely on a third party for obtaining the KYC information. It shall be ensured by the reporting entity that the third party is not based in a country or jurisdiction assessed as high risk.

6.7 Suspicious Transaction Monitoring and Reporting

6.7.1 Reporting entities shall ensure that appropriate steps are taken to enable suspicious transactions to be recognized and have appropriate procedures for reporting suspicious transactions.

6.7.2 A list of circumstances which may be in the nature of suspicious transactions is given below. This list is only illustrative and whether a particular transaction is suspicious or not will depend upon the background, details of the transactions and other facts and circumstances:

(i) Clients whose identity verification seems difficult or clients that appear not to cooperate;
(ii) Asset management services for clients where the source of the funds is not clear or not in keeping with clients' apparent standing/business activity;
(iii) Clients based in high-risk jurisdictions;
(iv) Substantial increases in business without apparent cause;
(v) Clients transferring large sums of money to or from overseas locations with instructions for payment in cash;

6.7.3 Any suspicious transaction shall be immediately notified to the Principal Officer or the Designated Director within the reporting entity. The notification may be done in the form of a detailed report with specific reference to the clients, transactions and the nature /reason of suspicion. However, it shall be ensured that there is continuity in dealing with the client as normal until told otherwise and the client shall not be told of the report/ suspicion.

6.7.4 It is likely that in some cases transactions are abandoned or aborted by clients on being asked to give some details or to provide documents. It is clarified that reporting entities shall report all such attempted transactions in STRs, even if not completed by clients, irrespective of the amount of the transaction.

7. Liability for failure to fulfil obligations:

As prescribed under Section 13 of the PMLA, any reporting entity may be required to get its records audited by a Chartered Accountant appointed by the Central Government. A monetary penalty may also be imposed on the reporting entity, its director or the employees for failure to fulfil the obligations cast upon them by the PMLA or rules made there under. A delay in not reporting a transaction as prescribed under these rules shall also constitute violation of the PMLA and the rules made thereunder.

8. List of documents required for KYC:

As required under rule 9 of PMLR, the following is an illustrative list of documents, which may be obtained from the clients for ascertaining their identity under KYC requirement:

Features	Officially Valid Documents
Accounts of individuals	
- Legal name and any other names used	(i) Passport (ii) PAN card (iii) Voter's Identity Card (iv) Driving licence (v) Identity card issued by the employer (vi) Letter from a recognized public authority or public servant verifying the identity and residence of the client
- Correct permanent address	(i) Telephone bill (ii) Bank account statement (iii) Letter from any recognized public authority (iv) Electricity bill (v) Ration card (vi) Letter from employer (vii) any one document which provides client information to the satisfaction of the reporting entity

सत्यमेव जयते

लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

Accounts of companies - Name of the company - Principal place of business - Mailing address of the company - Telephone/Fax Number	(i) Certificate of incorporation and Memorandum & Articles of Association (ii) Resolution of the Board of Directors to open an account and identification of those who have authority to operate the account (iii) Power of Attorney granted to its managers, officers or employees to transact business on its behalf (iv) Copy of PAN allotment letter (v) Copy of the telephone bill
Accounts of partnership firms - Legal name - Address - Names of all partners and their addresses - Telephone numbers of the firm and partners	(i) Registration certificate, if registered (ii) Partnership deed (iii) Power of Attorney granted to a partner or an employee of the firm to transact business on its behalf (iv) Any officially valid document identifying the partners and the persons holding the Power of Attorney and their addresses (v) Telephone bill in the name of firm/ partners
Accounts of trusts & foundations - Names of trustees, settlers, beneficiaries and signatories - Names and addresses of the founder, the managers /directors and the beneficiaries - Telephone/fax numbers	(i) Certificate of registration, if registered (ii) Power of Attorney granted to transact business on its behalf (iii) Any officially valid document to identify the trustees, settlors, beneficiaries and those holding Power of Attorney, founders/managers/ directors and their addresses (iv) Resolution of the managing body of the foundation/association (v) Telephone bill

लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

9. Maintenance of records of transactions/ Information to be recorded/Preservation of records/ Cash and Suspicious transactions reporting to FIU-IND:

9.1. Section 12 of the PMLA casts the obligation upon every reporting entity to maintain records of all transactions in such a manner that all individual transactions are reconstructed and furnishing of information related to transactions to Director FIU-IND. It also provides for preservation of information and records for a period of five years. The procedure for maintenance of records of transactions, information required to be recorded, procedure and manner of maintaining information and procedure and manner of furnishing information is prescribed under Rule 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the PMLR. All reporting entities are required to ensure compliance of the aforesaid provisions. These provisions are detailed in succeeding paragraphs.

9.2. **Maintenance of records of transactions (nature and value):** All reporting entities need to put in place a system of maintaining records of transactions, as prescribed under Rule 3, as below:

(i) All cash transactions of the value of more than Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency.

(ii) All series of cash transactions integrally connected to each other which have been individually valued below Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency where such series of transactions have taken place within a month and the monthly aggregate exceeds an amount of Rs. 10 lakh or its equivalent in foreign currency.

(iii) All cash transactions where forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes have been used as genuine or where any forgery of a valuable security or a document has taken place facilitating the transactions.

(iv) All suspicious transactions whether or not made in cash and by way of deposits or credits, as provided under sub rule 1(D) of Rule 3 of the said rules.

9.3 **Information required to be maintained:**

The records as referred to in Rule 3 of PMLR shall contain all necessary information to permit reconstruction of individual transaction, including the following information:

(a) the nature of the transactions;
(b) the amount of the transaction and the currency in which it was denominated;
(c) the date on which the transaction was conducted; and
(d) the parties to the transaction

The reporting entity shall maintain these records of documents evidencing identity of its clients and beneficial owners as well as account files and business correspondence relating to its clients.

9.4. **Retention of information and records:**

The information and records maintained for the purpose of these guidelines, as envisaged under Section 12 of the PMLA, shall be maintained by the reporting entity for a period of five years from the date of transaction between a client and the reporting entity. These records may be called for by the investigation authorities or the Director FIU-IND along with any other information as they may deem necessary as evidence for investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings under the PMLA and the rules made thereunder. In cases where the records relate to on-going investigations or transactions which have been the subject of suspicious transaction reporting, they shall be retained until it is confirmed that the case has been closed.

9.5. **Reporting to Financial Intelligence Unit-India:**

In terms of the PMLR, reporting entities are required to report information relating to cash and suspicious transactions to the Director, Financial Intelligence Unit-India (FIU-IND) at the following address:

Director, FIU-IND,
Financial Intelligence Unit-India, 6th Floor, Hotel Samrat, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi-110021.
Website: http://fiuindia.gov.in

9.6 **Format for reporting Transactions:**

The format for reporting transactions, including suspicious transactions made or attempted, as required under Rule 7(2) of PMLR, would be as prescribed by the FIU.

9.7 **Prohibition on tipping off and maintaining confidentiality of information:**

9.7.1 Reporting entities and their directors, officers and employees (permanent and temporary) shall be prohibited from disclosing ("tipping off") that a STR or related information is being reported or provided to the FIU-IND. This prohibition on tipping off extends not only to the filing of the STR and/ or related information but even before, during and after the submission of an STR. Thus, it shall be ensured that there is no tipping off to the client at any level. It is clarified that the reporting entities, irrespective of the amount of transaction and/or the threshold limit envisaged for reporting under PMLA, 2002, shall file STR if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the transactions involve proceeds of crime.

9.7.2 Reporting entities shall ensure that Every information collected from the customer, maintained, verified and furnished to the FIU, including the Cash Transaction Report and Suspicious Transaction Report shall be kept strictly confidential and details thereof shall not be divulged to anyone.

9.7.3 Reporting entities, its directors and employees shall not be liable to any civil or criminal proceedings against them for furnishing information relating to cash transactions and suspicious transactions to the Director, FIU-IND.

10. Implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA):

10.1. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Order dated 2nd February, 2021 issued under F. No. 14014/01/2019/CFT under Section 51A of the UAPA provides that the reporting entity should not enter into a transaction with a client whose identity matches with any person in the sanction list or with banned entities and those reported to have links with terrorists or terrorist organizations. A list of individuals and entities subject to UN sanction measures under UNSC Resolutions (hereinafter referred to as 'designated individuals/entities') is compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The reporting entities shall periodically check the MHA website for an updated list of banned entities. The reporting entities shall maintain an updated list of designated individuals/entities in electronic form and run a check on the given parameters on a regular basis to verify whether designated individuals/ entities have entered into a transaction with them.

10.2. An updated list of individuals and entities which are subject to various sanction measures as approved by the Security Council Committee

established pursuant to UNSC 1267 can be accessed from the United Nations website at:
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml.

10.3. By virtue of Section 51A of the UAPA, the Central Government is empowered to freeze, seize or attach funds of and/or prevent entry into or transit through India any individual or entities that are suspected to be engaged in terrorism.

10.4. Reporting entities shall ensure that no transactions are ever made with any of the entities or individuals included in the list and if it has happened, details of all such clients shall immediately be intimated to the Regulator and FIU-IND

11. Recruitment and training of employees:

11.1 **Recruitment of Employees**:

The reporting entities shall have adequate screening procedures in place to ensure high standards when hiring employees. They shall identify the key positions within their own organization structures having regard to the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and the size of their business and ensure the employees taking up such key positions are suitable and competent to perform their duties.

11.2 **Employees' Training:**

Reporting entities must have an ongoing employee training programme so that their staff is adequately trained in AML and CFT procedures. Training requirements shall have specific focuses for frontline staff, back-office staff, compliance staff, risk management staff and staff dealing with new clients. It is crucial that all those concerned fully understand the rationale behind these guidelines, obligations and requirements, implement them consistently and are sensitive to the risks of their systems being misused by unscrupulous elements.

These guidelines have been issued under the provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and the rule made thereunder, more specifically, the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005. For any clarifications on these guidelines or removal of doubts, the provisions of the said act and rules may be referred.

सत्यमेव जयते

लेखापरीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS

12. DEFINITIONS:

For the purposes of these guidelines,

a) **Beneficial Owner** means an individual who ultimately owns or controls a client of a reporting entity or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted and includes a person who exercises ultimate effective control over a juridical person.

As specified in Rule 9(3) of PMLR, the beneficial owner shall be determined as under:

I. where the client is a company, the beneficial owner is the natural person(s), who, whether acting alone or together, or through one or more juridical persons, has a controlling ownership interest or who exercises control through other means.

Explanation- 1. "Controlling ownership interest" means ownership of or entitlement to more than 25% of shares or capital or profits of the company;

2. "Control" shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements;

II. where the client is a partnership firm, the beneficial owner is the natural person(s) who, whether acting alone or together, or through one or more juridical person, has ownership of/ entitlement to more than 15% of capital or profits of the partnership;

III. where the client is an unincorporated association or body of individuals, the beneficial owner is the natural person(s), who, whether acting alone or together, or through one or more juridical person, has ownership of or entitlement to more than 15% of the property or capital or profits of such association or body of individuals;

IV. where no natural person is identified under (a) or (b) or (c) above, the beneficial owner is the relevant natural person who holds the position of senior managing official;

V. where the client is a trust, the identification of beneficial owner(s) shall include 'identification of the author of the trust, the trustee, the beneficiaries with 15% or more interest in the trust and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust through a chain of control or ownership; and

VI. where the client or the owner of the controlling interest is a company listed on a stock exchange, or is a subsidiary of such a company, it is not necessary to identify and verify the identity of any shareholder or beneficial owner of such companies.

b) **Central KYC Records Registry** means a reporting entity, substantially owned and controlled by the Central Government, and authorised by that Government through a notification in the Official Gazette to receive, store, safeguard and retrieve the KYC records in digital form of a client as referred to in clause (ha) of Section 2 of the PMLA in such manner and to perform such other functions as may be required under PMLR.

c) **Client** means a person who is engaged in a financial transaction or activity with a reporting entity and includes a person on whose behalf the person who engaged in the transaction or activity, is acting.

For the purpose of these Guidelines, a client includes a customer engaged or attempting to engage into a transaction with the Reporting Entity.

d) **Designated Director** means a person designated by the reporting entity to ensure overall compliance with the obligations imposed under chapter IV of the PMLA and the PMLR and includes –
   a) The Managing Director or a Whole-Time Director duly authorised by the Board of Directors if the reporting entity is a company;
   b) The managing partner, if the reporting entity is a partnership firm;
   c) The proprietor, if the reporting entity is a proprietorship firm;
   d) The managing trustee, if the reporting entity is a trust;
   e) a person or individual, as the case may be, who controls and manages the affairs of the reporting entity if the reporting entity is an unincorporated association or a body of individuals; and
   f) such other person or class of persons as may be notified by the Government if the reporting entity does not fall in any of the categories above."

e) **Person** includes an individual; a Hindu undivided family; a company; a firm; an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; every artificial juridical person not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses; and any agency, office or branch owned or controlled by any of the persons mentioned above.

f) **Principal Officer** is defined as an officer so designated by a reporting entity. The Principal Officer would act as a central reference point in facilitating onward reporting of suspicious transactions and for playing an active role in the identification and assessment of potentially suspicious transactions and shall have access to and be able to report to senior management at the next reporting level or the Board of Directors. It is desirable that the 'Principal

Officer' is of a sufficiently senior position and is able to discharge the functions with independence and authority.

g) **Real Estate Agent** means a real estate agent as defined under clause (zm) of section 2 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, who negotiates or acts on behalf of one person in a transaction of transfer of his plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, in a real estate project, by way of sale, with another person or transfer of plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, of any other person to him and receives remuneration or fees or any other charges for his services whether as a commission or otherwise and includes a person who introduces, through any medium, prospective buyers and sellers to each other for negotiation for sale or purchase of plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, and includes property dealers, brokers, middlemen by whatever name called and **having annual turnover of Rupees twenty lakhs and above.**

h) **Regulator** means the Directorate General of Audit (DGA), Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC)

i) **Suspicious transaction** is defined as a transaction, including an attempted transaction, **whether or not made in cash**, which, to a person acting in good faith-

(i) gives rise to a reasonable ground of suspicion that it may involve proceeds of an offence specified in the Schedule to the PMLA, 2002, regardless of the value involved; or

(ii) appears to be made in circumstances of unusual or unjustified complexity; or

(iii) appears to have no economic rationale or bona fide purpose; or

(iv) gives rise to a reasonable ground of suspicion that it may involve financing of the activities relating to terrorism.

Explanation- Transaction involving financing of the activities relating to terrorism includes transaction involving funds suspected to be linked or related to, or to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by a terrorist, terrorist organisation or those who finance or are attempting to finance terrorism.

सत्यमेव जयते
Government of India

आज़ादी का अमृत महोत्सव

लेखा परीक्षा महानिदेशालय
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF AUDIT
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS
C.R. BUILDING, I.P. ESTATE,
NEW DELHI-110109
दूरभाष / TEL. :011-23370075
ई-मेल / Email: dg.audit-cbec@nic.in

22-02-2023

To

1. The Chairwoman/ Chairman,
   Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
   All States & Union Territories.

2. The Principal Secretary (Housing)
   States & Union Territories.

अध्यक्ष कोषांग
85/2023
23 FEB 2023
भू-सम्पदा विनियामक प्राधिकरण
बिहार

Madam/ Sir,

Subject: Implementation of Section 51A of UAPA, 1967: Updates to UNSC's 1267/ 1989 ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List: 33 entries- reg.

Please refer to the Guidelines for Reporting Entities (Real Estate Agents) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002dated 17.02.2023 **(The Guidelines)**, issued by DG Audit (The Regulator under PMLA).

In view of Para 10 of the Guidelines, please find enclosed herewith details of **29 individuals** (As on 2nd February, 2023) and **1 individual** (As on 16th January, 2023)subjected to the United Nation Security Council sanctions list of individuals under UNSCR 1267/1989 ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, available on UNSC website (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/press-releases), as per the MHA's Order No. 14014/01/2019/CFT dated 02.02.2021 for implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

2. Please also find enclosed copies of Gazette Notifications No. 68 dated 06.01.2023, No. 98 dated 07.01.2023 and No.99 dated 09.01.2023 in respect of the **three individuals**, which have been declared as 'Terrorists' and have been listed in the Fourth Schedule of the UA(P) Act, 1967, under Section 35 (1) (a) of the UA(P) Act, 1967.

3. It is requested to forward these details to the Real Estate Agents

who are the reporting entities under the PMLA. The reporting entities may be advised to refrain from entering into any transaction with the persons whose identity matches with the persons detailed in the aforesaid lists/ Notifications and to immediately report to the Regulator and the Director, FIU-IND, in case they come across any such person. They may also be advised to perform enhanced due diligence in respect of a client whose name matches with any of the persons so listed.

Yours faithfully,

Encls: as above

(Dr. Amandeep Singh)
Additional Director General

Ministry of External Affairs
UNP Division

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CRASH

Room No. 2027,
Jawaharlal Nehru Bhawan,
Janpath
Ministry of External Affairs

No. UAPA/ Update 01 of 2023

Dated:
17 January, 2023

Subject: Implementation of Section 51A of UAPA,1967: Updates to UNSC's 1267/ 1989 ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List: Addition of 1 entry

On 16 January, 2023, the **UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267** (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities **approved addition of below mentioned entry** on its ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2368 (2017), and adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

A. Individuals

QDi.433 Name: 1. ABDUL 2. REHMAN 3. MAKKI 4: na
Name (original Script): na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 Dec. 1954 **POB:** Bahawalpur, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.: a)** Abdur Rehman Makki; **b)** Abdur Rahman Makki, **c)** Abdul Rahman Makki; **d)** Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki; **e)** Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki; **f)** Hafiz Abdul Rehman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport No: a)** Pakistan number CG9153881, issued on 2 Nov 2007 **b)** Pakistan number A5199819 **National Identification No: a)** Pakistan 6110111883885 **b)** Pakistan 34454009709 **Address:** Tayyiba Markaz, Muridke, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2023 **Other Information:** He is deputy Amir/Chief of LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA (LET)

(QDe.118) a.k.a JAMAAT-UD-DAWA (JUD) and Head of Political Affairs Wing JUD/LET. He also served as head of LET's foreign relations department and member of Shura (governing body). He is the brother-in-law of JUD/LET Chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (Qdi.263). Father's name is Hafiz Abdullah Bahwalpuri. Photo is available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

2. In accordance with paragraph 55 of resolution 2368 (2017), the Committee has made accessible on its website the narrative summaries of reasons for listing of the above entry at the following URL: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries.

3. Press release regarding the above can be found at https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15177.doc.htm

4. The UNSC press releases concerning amendments to the list are available at URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/press-releases

5. The latest versions of the Sanctions lists are accessible on the UN Security Council's website at the following URL:

a) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1989 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list

b) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to Taliban https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials

6. This information is being issued in pursuance of the instructions contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India' order F. No. 14014/01/2019/CFT, dated 2 February 2021, regarding the Procedure for implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 to direct all concerned to apply without delay travel restrictions, arms embargo and to freeze the funds and other financial resources of listed individuals and entities in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions. The details of the sanctions measures and exemptions are available at the following URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267#further_information

7. As per MHA's instructions, any request for de-listing received by any bank, stock exchanges/ depositories, intermediaries regulated by SEBI and Insurance companies is to be forwarded electronically to Joint Secretary (CTCR), MHA for consideration. Individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the Security Council's ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List can submit their request for delisting to an independent and impartial Ombudsperson who has been appointed by the United Nations

Email

Secretary-General. More details are available at the following URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/application

8. Necessary action may kindly be taken in terms of Ministry of Home Affairs' Order dated 2nd February 2021 delineating the procedure for implementation of Section 51A of the UAPA .

(Saurabh)
Under Secretary

To:

1. Shri Rajesh Verma, Secretary, MoCA : secy.mca@nic.in
2. Shri M. AjitKumar, Chairman, CBIC: chmn-cbic@gov.in
3. Shri Praveen Vashista, Additional Secretary (CTCR), MHA; jsctcr-mha@gov.in ; jslwe-mha@nic.in
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6. Shri Sumant Singh, JS (F-I), MHA; jsf@mha.gov.in
7. Shri Saurav Sinha. CGM in charge.
RBI: skkar@rbi.org.in, cgmaml@rbi.org.in, hareeshkumarv@rbi.org.in
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9. Shri Rajesh Kumar Dangeti, General Manager,
SEBI: rajeshkd@sebi.gov.in
10. Smt. Sapna Sinha, Deputy General Manager-FATF Division, MIRSD, SEBI sapnas@sebi.gov.in
11. Shri A. Venkateswara Rao, General Manager, HoD (SDD) & CVO, IRDAI: avrao@irda.gov.in

Copy for information to:
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Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav

INDIA UN SECURITY COUNCIL 2021-2022

रजिस्ट्री सं. डी.एल.- 33004/99 REGD. No. D. L.-33004/99

भारत का राजपत्र
The Gazette of India

सी.जी.-डी.एल.-अ.-06012023-241717
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असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

सं. 68] नई दिल्ली, शुक्रवार, जनवरी 6, 2023/पौष 16, 1944
No. 68] NEW DELHI, FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 2023/PAUSHA 16, 1944

गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली, 6 जनवरी, 2023

का.आ. 71(अ).— विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) को व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलापों के और प्रभावी निवारण करने के लिए तथा आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों और उससे संबंधित मामलों से निटपने के लिए अधिनियमित किया गया है ;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) का खंड (क) और उपधारा (2), केंद्रीय सरकार को उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में किसी व्यष्टि के नाम को जोड़ने के लिए सशक्त करता है, यदि उसका यह विश्वास है कि वह आतंकवाद में सम्मिलित है ;

और, अरबाज अहमद मीर पुत्र मन्जूर अहमद मीर, जो गांव गुफ्वल, कैमोह, जिला कुलगाम, जम्मू-कश्मीर से संबंधित है, जो वर्तमान में पाकिस्तान में रहकर सीमापार से लश्कर-ए-तैयबा (एलईटी) के लिए कार्य कर रहा है ;

और, लश्कर-ए-तैयबा उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची के क्रम सं. 5 पर आतंकवादी संगठन के रूप में सूचीबद्ध है ;

और, उक्त अरबाज अहमद मीर लक्षित हत्याओं में शामिल रहा है और जम्मू-कश्मीर के कुलगाम में एक महिला शिक्षक रजनी बाला की हत्या में मुख्य षड़यंत्रकारी रहा है ;

और, उक्त अरबाज अहमद मीर कश्मीर घाटी में आतंकवादी कृत्यों के समन्वय में शामिल है तथा सीमापार से गैर कानूनी रूप से हथियारों या गोला-बारूद या विस्फोटकों की पूर्ति कर आतंकियों की सहायता करता है ;

और, केंद्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि अरबाज अहमद मीर आतंकवादी कृत्यों में शामिल है और उक्त अरबाज अहमद मीर को उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन आतंकवादी के रूप में जोड़ा जाना है ;

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार, विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित संशोधन करती है, अर्थात् :-

उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में क्रम सं. 50 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात्, निम्नलिखित क्रम सं. और प्रविष्टियां अंतः स्थापित की जाएगी, अर्थात् :-

"51. अरबाज अहमद मीर "।

[फा. सं. 11034/09/2022-सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ट, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण :-- विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की चौथी अनुसूची का अंतिम संशोधन अधिसूचना संख्यांक का.आ. 39 (अ), तारीख 5 जनवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 6th January, 2023

S.O. 71(E).— Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals, and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities, and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 35 of the said Act empowers the Central Government to add the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, if it believes that he is involved in terrorism;

And whereas, Arbaz Ahmad Mir son of Manzoor Ahmad Mir belonging to Village-Gufbal, Qaimoh, District-Kulgam, Jammu and Kashmir, presently based in Pakistan, is working for Lashkar-E-Taiba (LeT) from across the border;

And whereas, Lashkar-E-Taiba is listed as a terrorist organisation at serial No. 5 of the First Schedule to the said Act;

And whereas, the said Arbaz Ahmad Mir is involved in target killing and has emerged as main conspirator in killing of one female teacher namely Rajni Bala in Kulgam, Jammu and Kashmir;

And whereas, the said Arbaz Ahmad Mir is involved in coordinating terrorism in Kashmir valley and supporting terrorists by transporting illegal arms or ammunition or explosives from across the border;

And whereas, the Central Government believes that Arbaz Ahmad Mir is involved in terrorism and the said Arbaz Ahmad Mir is to be added as a terrorist under the said Act;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 50 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"51. Arbaz Ahmad Mir ".

[F. No. 11034/09/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note:- The Fourth Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended *vide* the notification number S.O. 39 (E), dated the 5th January, 2023.

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भारत का राजपत्र
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असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

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गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली, 7 जनवरी, 2023

का.आ. 104(अ).— विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) को व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलापों के और प्रभावी निवारण करने के लिए तथा आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों और उससे संबंधित मामलों से निपटने के लिए अधिनियमित किया गया है ;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) का खंड (क) और उपधारा (2), केंद्रीय सरकार को उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में किसी व्यष्टि के नाम को जोड़ने के लिए सशक्त करता है, यदि उसका यह विश्वास है कि वह आतंकवाद में सम्मिलित है ;

और, डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार, जिसके जन्म की तारीख 2 दिसंबर, 1981 है, पुत्र मुहम्मद मकबूल डार, मूल रूप से जम्मू-कश्मीर के बारामूला/बेमिना जिले के बगूरा तहसील के अंतर्गत गांव बांदी पाईं का रहने वाला है, जो वर्तमान में सऊदी अरब के दहरान, अश शरकियाह, दमन में रह रहा है, इसका संबंध हिजबुल मुजाहिदीन से है ;

और, हिजबुल मुजाहिदीन उक्त अधिनियम की पहली अनुसूची के क्रम सं. 8 पर आतंकवादी संगठन के रूप में सूचीबद्ध है ;

और, उक्त डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार, सोशल मीडिया प्लेटफार्म्स के माध्यम से कश्मीर घाटी के युवाओं को आंतकी गतिविधियों के लिए उकसाने में शामिल रहा है ;

और, उक्त डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार, सोशल मीडिया प्लेटफार्म पर उपस्थित उग्र विचारधारा वाले प्रमुख लोगों में से एक है और कश्मीरी युवाओं को गलत तरीके से प्रभावित कर उन्हें भारत सरकार और सुरक्षा बलों के विरुद्ध हथियार उठाने के लिए प्रेरित करता है ;

और, उक्त डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार, राष्ट्रीय अन्वेषण अभिकरण द्वारा अन्वेषित किए जा रहे एक मामले में अभियुक्त है, जो आतंकवादी संगठनों के कैडर द्वारा सीमापार स्थित हैंडलर के निर्देश पर जम्मू-कश्मीर तथा दिल्ली सहित देश के बड़े शहरों में आतंकी हमलों के लिए षडयंत्र करने से संबंधित है ;

और, केंद्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार आतंकवादी कृत्यों में शामिल है और उक्त डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार को उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन आतंकवादी के रूप में जोड़ा जाना है ;

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार, विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित संशोधन करती है, अर्थात् :-

उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में क्रम सं. 51 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात्, निम्नलिखित क्रम सं. और प्रविष्टियां अंतः स्थापित की जाएगी, अर्थात् :-

"52. डॉ. आसिफ मकबूल डार "।

[फा. सं. 11034/09/2022-सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ट, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण :-- विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की चौथी अनुसूची का अंतिम संशोधन अधिसूचना संख्यांक का.आ. 71(अ)., तारीख 6 जनवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था ।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 7th January, 2023

S.O. 104(E).—Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 35 of the said Act empowers the Central Government to add the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, if it believes that he is involved in terrorism;

And whereas, Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar having date of birth on the 2nd December, 1981, son of Mohammad Maqbool Dar, belogning orignially to Village-Bandey Payeen, Tehsil-Wagoora, District –Baramula/Bemina, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, presently based at Daman, Ash Sharqiyah, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, is associated with Hizb-Ul-Muhahideen;

And whereas, Hizb-Ul- Mujahideen is listed as a terrorist organisation at serial No. 8 of the First Schedule to the said Act;

And whereas, the said Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar is in involved in instigating or provoking the youth of Kashmir Valley for terrorist activities by using social media platforms;

And whereas, the said Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar is one of the leading radical voices on social media and involved in nefariously influencing Kashmiri youth to take up arms against Indian Government and Security Forces;

And whereas, the said Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar is accused in a case investigated by the National Investigating Agency relating to conspiracy hatched by the cadres of terrorist organisation to undertake violent terrorist act in Jammu and Kashmir and major cities in India including New Delhi on the direction of handlers based across the border;

And whereas, the Central Government believes that Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar is involved in terrorism and the said Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar is to be added as a terrorist under the said Act;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 51 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"52. Dr. Asif Maqbool Dar ".

[F. No. 11034/09/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note:- The Fourth Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended *vide* the notification number S.O.71(E)., dated the 6th January , 2023.

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सत्यमेव जयते

भारत का राजपत्र
The Gazette of India

सी.जी.-डी.एल.-अ.-09012023-241785
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असाधारण
EXTRAORDINARY

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

प्राधिकार से प्रकाशित
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

सं. 99] नई दिल्ली, सोमवार, जनवरी 9, 2023/पौष 19, 1944
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गृह मंत्रालय

अधिसूचना

नई दिल्ली 9 जनवरी, 2023

का.आ. **105(अ)**.—विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 (1967 का 37) (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा गया है) को व्यष्टियों और संगमों के कतिपय विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलापों के और प्रभावी निवारण करने के लिए तथा आतंकवादी क्रियाकलापों और उससे समबन्धित मामलों से निपटने के लिए अधिनियमित किया गया है ;

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) का खंड (क) और उपधारा (2), केंद्रीय सरकार को उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में किसी व्यष्टि के नाम को जोड़ने के लिए सशक्त करता है, यदि उसका यह विश्वास है कि वह आतंकवाद में सम्मिलित है ;

और, अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला, जिसके जन्म की तारीख 21 मई, 1996 है, पुत्र चरनजीत सिंह गिल, जिसका जन्म जगरान, लुधियाना, पंजाब में हुआ है, यह वार्ड नं0 02, पत्ती माल, वीपीओ-डाला, पुलिस स्टेशन – मेहना, जिला मोगा, पंजाब, भारत का रहने वाला है, जो वर्तमान में कनाड़ा में रह रहा है, यह खालिस्तान टाइगर फोर्स (केटीएफ) नामक संगठन से संबंध रखता है ;

और, उक्त अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला का, उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन घोषित आतंकवादी हरदीप सिंह निज्जर से नजदीकी संबंध है और वह उसकी ओर से आतंकी माड्यूल्स चलाता है ;

और, उक्त अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला, आतंकवादी गतिविधियों के अतिरिक्त जघन्य अपराधों जैसे हत्या, जबरन वसूली और लक्षित हत्याओं में शामिल है ;

और, उक्त अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला, बड़ी मात्रा में सीमापार से नशीले पदार्थों और हथियारों की तस्करी तथा आतंक के वित्तीयन में शामिल है ;

और, उक्त अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला, राष्ट्रीय अन्वेषण अभिकरण द्वारा रजिस्ट्रीकृत और अन्वेषित विभिन्न मामलों में अभियुक्त है, जिनमें लक्षित हत्याओं, आंतक के वित्तीपन के लिए वसूली, हत्या का प्रयास, साम्प्रदायिक सौहार्द बिगाड़ने और भारत के पंजाब राज्य में लोगों के बीच भय पैदा करना शामिल है ;

और, केंद्रीय सरकार का यह विश्वास है कि अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला आतंकवादी कृत्यों में शामिल है और उक्त अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला को उक्त अधिनियम के अधीन आतंकवादी के रूप में जोड़ा जाना है ;

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार, विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 35 की उपधारा (1) के खंड (क) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में निम्नलिखित संशोधन करती है, अर्थात् :-

उक्त अधिनियम की चौथी अनुसूची में क्रम सं. 52 और उससे संबंधित प्रविष्टियों के पश्चात्, निम्नलिखित क्रम सं. और प्रविष्टियां अंतः स्थापित की जाएगी, अर्थात् :-

"53. अर्शदीप सिंह गिल उर्फ अर्श डाला "

[फा. सं. 11034/09/2022-सीटी-I]

प्रवीण वशिष्ट, अपर सचिव

टिप्पण :-- विधिविरूद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की चौथी अनुसूची का अंतिम संशोधन अधिसूचना संख्यांक का.आ. 104 (अ), तारीख 7 जनवरी, 2023 द्वारा किया गया था ।

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 9th January, 2023

S.O.. 105(E).—Whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;

And whereas, clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 35 of the said Act empowers the Central Government to add the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, if it believes that he is involved in terrorism;

And whereas, Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala having date of birth on the 21st May, 1996, son of Charanjit Singh Gill, born in Jagraon, Ludhiana, Punjab, resident of Ward No. 02, Patti Mall, VPO-Dala, Police Station-Mehna, District Moga, Punjab, India ,presently based in Canada, is associated with Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF) ;

And whereas, the said Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is very close to Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a designated terrorist under the said Act and runs terror modules on behalf of him;

And whereas, the said Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is involved in heinous crimes such as murder, extortion and targeted killings besides terror activities;

And whereas, the said Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is involved in terror financing, cross border smuggling of drugs or weapons in large scale;

And whereas, the said Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is accused in various cases registered and investigated by the National Investigation Agency including targeted killing, extorting money for terror funding, attempt to murder, disturbing communal harmony and creating terror among the people in the state of Punjab, India;

And whereas, the Central Government believes that Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is involved in terrorism and the said Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala is to be added as a terrorist under the said Act;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, namely:-

In the Fourth Schedule to the said Act, after serial number 52 and entries relating thereto, the following serial number and entries shall be inserted, namely:-

"53. Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dala ".

[F.No. 11034/09/2022/CT-I]

PRAVEEN VASHISTA, Addl. Secy.

Note:—The Fourth Schedule to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was last amended *vide* the notification number S.O. 104 (E), dated the 7th January, 2023.

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Ministry of External Affairs
UNP Division

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CRASH

Room No. 2027,
Jawaharlal Nehru Bhawan,
Janpath

Ministry of External Affairs

No. UAPA/ Update 03 of

2023

Dated: 03
February, 2023

Subject: Implementation of Section 51A of UAPA,1967: Updates to UNSC's 1267/ 1989 ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List: Amendments to 29 entries

On 2 February 2023, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities enacted the amendments specified with underline and strikethrough in the entries below on its ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2610 (2021), and adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

A. Individuals

1) QDi.002 **Name**: 1: AMIN 2: MUHAMMAD 3: UL HAQ 4: SAAM KHAN
Title: na Designation: na **DOB**: 1960 **POB**: Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan **Good quality a.k.a.**: a) Al-Haq, Amin b) Amin, Muhammad **Low quality a.k.a.**: a) Dr. Amin b) Ul-Haq, Dr.

Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:
3 February 2015
2 February 2023
Reason for listing:
Abdul Manan Agha was listed on 17 October 2001 pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Usama bin Laden (deceased) or the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of or "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Al-Qaida ~~(QDe.004).~~
Related listed individuals and entities:
Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

3) **QDi.119 Name:** 1: ARIS 2: MUNANDAR 3: na 4: na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB: a)** 1 Jan. 1971 ~~b) Between 1962 and 1968~~ **POB:** Sambi, Boyolali, Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia (as at Dec. 2003) **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 4 Oct. 2006, 12 Dec. 2014, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals

4) **QDi.186 Name:** 1: ABU 2: RUSDAN 3: na 4: na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 16 Aug. 1960 **POB:** Kudus, Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.: a)** Abu Thoriq **b)** Rusdjan **c)** Rusjan **d)** Rusydan **e)** Thoriquddin **f)** Thoriquiddin **g)** Thoriquidin **h)** Toriquddin **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** ~~na~~ **Indonesia, number 1608600001** **Address:** na **Listed on:** 16 May 2005 (amended on 12 Dec. 2014, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Arrested in Indonesia in 2021. Was the acting Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, QDe.092) emir before his arrest, and remains a senior figure of JI. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

ABU RUSDAN
In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.
QDi.186 ABU RUSDAN
Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
30 October 2009
Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:

5) **QDi.204 Name:** 1: ISNILON 2: TOTONI 3: HAPILON 4: na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 18 Mar. 1966 b) 10 Mar. 1967 **POB:** Bulanza, Lantawan, Basilan, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Isnilon Hapilun b) Isnilun Hapilun c) Tuan Isnilon **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Musab b) Salahudin **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Basilan, Philippines (previous location until 2016) b) Lanao del Sur, Philippines (location since 2016) **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 4 Oct. 2017, 6 Dec. 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Senior leader of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (QDe.001). Leader of local affiliates of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), in the southern Philippines as of May 2017. Reportedly deceased in 2017. Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: brown; height: 5 feet 6 inches – 168 cm; weight: 120 pounds – 54 kg; build: slim; complexion: light-skinned; has facial birthmarks. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Wanted by the Philippines authorities for terrorist offences and by authorities of the United States of America for involvement in terrorist acts. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017) was concluded on 4 Dec. 2019. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

ISNILON TOTONI HAPILON

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.204 ISNILON TOTONI HAPILON

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
26 August 2009

Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:
3 February 2015
4 October 2017
17 April 2018
2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

Isnilon Totoni Hapilon was listed on **6 December 2005** pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1617 (2005) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf, or in support of" the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001).

Additional information:

Isnilon Totoni Hapilon ~~is~~ was one of the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (QDe.001). Since 1997, he has held several positions in operational leadership of the group and prior to the death of ASG founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani in December 1998, Hapilon was a member of ASG's central committee. Hapilon has provided protection to Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) members, including Umar Patek (QDi.294). Hapilon ~~has~~ had perpetrated several brutal acts of violence including kidnappings of Philippine and foreign nationals. As of a.k.a.: a) Abu Fatih b) Thoyib, Ibnu c) Toyib, Ibnu d) Abu Fathi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** Indonesia, number T710219 (issued in Sukoharjo, Central Java, Indonesia) ~~na~~ **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Apr. 2006 (amended on 6 Dec. 2019, 2 Feb. 2023 **Other information:** Senior leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017) was concluded on 4 Dec. 2019 INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible]Notices-Individuals.

7)QDi.404 **Name:** 1: ~~Muhammad~~ MUHAMMAD 2: ~~Bahrum~~ BAHRUM 3: ~~Naim~~ NAIM 4: ~~Anggih Tamtomo~~ ANGGIH TAMTOMO
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Sep. 1983 **POB:** a) Surakarta, Indonesia b) ~~Pekalongan, Indonesia~~ **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Bahrun Naim b) Anggih Tamtomo **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Rayyan b) Abu Rayan c) Abu Aisyah **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic b) Raqqa, Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 (amended on 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Syrian-based Indonesian national who has served in a variety of roles supporting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-[illegible]

8) QDi.407 **Name:** 1: OMAN 2: ROCHMAN 3: na 4: na
Title: Ustadz **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Jan. 1972 **POB:** Sumedang, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Oman Rahman b) Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman Al-Arkhabiliy c) Aman Abdul Rahman d) Aman Abdurahman e) Aman Abdurrachman f) Oman Abdulrohman g) Oman Abdurrahman h) Aman Abdurrahman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Pasir Putih Prison, Nusa Kambangan Island, Indonesia **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 (amended on 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** De facto leader for all Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), supporters in Indonesia, despite his incarceration in Indonesia since December 2010. Sentenced to death by the Indonesian Supreme Court. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible]/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-[illegible]

OMAN ROCHMAN

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.407 OMAN ROCHMAN

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
20 July 2017

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

identification no: ~~na~~ Kuwait, number 260012001546 **Address:** Kuwait (residence as at Mar. 2009) **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2008 (amended on 1 Jul. 2008, 23 Jul. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 14 Sep. 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible]/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

HAMID ABDALLAH AHMAD AL-ALI

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.236 HAMID ABDALLAH AHMAD AL-ALI

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 6 April 2009

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

Hamid Abdallah Ahmad al-Ali was listed on 16 January 2008 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 12 of resolution 1735 (2006) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating or perpetrating acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, or in support of", "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to" and "recruiting for" Al-Qaida affiliated cells in Kuwait.

Additional information:

Hamid Abdallah Ahmad al-Ali is a Kuwait-based terrorist facilitator and inciter who provided financial support and ideological justification for Al-Qaida-affiliated groups seeking to commit acts of terrorism in Kuwait, Iraq, and elsewhere. Along with Jaber Abdallah Jaber Ahmad al-Jalahmah (QDi.237) and Mubarak Mushakhas Sanad Mubarak al-Bathali (QDi.238), Al-Ali also recruits radicals in Kuwait for terrorist activity, including for Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Al-Ali provided financial support for these recruits, including paying their travel expenses to Iraq. Al-Ali obtained much of this money from collections in his mosque. Al-Ali has supported every stage of the terrorist financing life-cycle, from financing terrorist groups and activity, to facilitating deadly attacks, and inciting others to join campaigns of violence.

Evidence shows that Al-Ali's efforts to promote radical ideology include the provision of material support for terrorist organizations, including those in Iraq that are affiliated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004).

Al-Ali was a religious leader and financier for a Kuwait-based terrorist cell that plotted to attack United States and Kuwaiti targets in early 2005. This Al-Qaida associated terrorist cell was under his ideological supervision. Al-Ali visited the group's terrorist camps in Kuwait, providing funds supporting acts of terrorism.

In addition to financial and ideological support and recruitment, Al-Ali also provided opportunities for potential recruits to obtain training in explosives in 2004. He used his website to provide technical advice for making explosives, chemical, and biological weapons.

In his role as a recruiter for terrorist organizations, Al-Ali has issued "fatwas" providing justification for acts of terrorism, including a fatwa endorsing suicide bombing operations

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Mubarak Mushakhas Sanad Mubarak al-Bathali, a key associate of Jaber Abdallah Jaber Ahmad al-Jalahmah (QDi.237), is a Kuwait-based terrorist facilitator and inciter. He also serves as a fundraiser and recruiter for the Al-Qaida (QDe.004) network. Al-Bathali has supported every stage of the terrorist financing life-cycle, from financing terrorist groups and activity, to facilitating deadly attacks, and inciting others to join campaigns of violence. Al-Bathali has spoken at several mosques in Kuwait to raise funds for Al-Qaida operatives. Al-Bathali raised funds in Kuwait for terrorist organizations over several years. In 1999, Al-Bathali met with several top Al-Qaida members and gave them $100,000. In 2001, Al-Bathali sent a courier to carry approximately $20,000 to an Al-Qaida finance manager in Pakistan. In 2002-2003, Al-Bathali contributed $20,000 to Ansar al-Islam (QDe.098) through contacts in Syria. In 2003 and 2004, Al-Bathali provided funds to Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), through intermediaries. In 2004, Al-Bathali gathered several hundred Kuwaiti dinars each week for terrorist organizations including Al-Qaida, Ansar al-Islam and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). In 2001, Al-Bathali and his son produced about 6,000 copies of a propaganda tape recorded by an advisor to Usama bin Laden (deceased). Al-Bathali was also supportive of the 8 October 2002 attack on United States of America Marines in Faylaka Island, Kuwait, which resulted in the death of a United States Marine.

In January 2003, Al-Bathali and Al-Jalahmah met with an individual who was involved in the 21 January 2003 Al-Qaida-linked terrorist attack on two United States contractors outside Camp Doha, Kuwait, and discussed financing his militant training operations.

In 2003, Al-Bathali reiterated his objectives of recruiting Muslim youth in the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to support Al-Qaida-affiliated fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan. This support was to include collecting donations for fighters, and CDs about Ansar al-Islam, and using the Internet for propaganda and fundraising purposes. In 2006, Al-Bathali continued to facilitate travel for extremists planning to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an interview published in May 2008, he acknowledged that he was recruiting young people to send them to fight abroad, in particular in Afghanistan, and that he had sent others previously to Iraq, Kosovo and Chechnya.

Al-Bathali was sentenced to prison by Kuwait for 3 years on 24 August 2018.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

Ansar al-Islam (QDe.098), listed on 24 February 2003

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118), listed on 2 May 2005

Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), listed on 18 October 2004

Hamid Abdallah Ahmed al-Ali (QDi.236), listed on 16 January 2008

Jaber Abdallah Jaber Ahmad al-Jalahmah (QDi. 237), listed on 16 January 2008

11) QDi.266 Name: 1: MAHMOUD 2: MOHAMMAD 3: AHMED 4: BAHAZIQ
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** **a)** 17 Aug. 1943 **b)** 1943 **c)** 1944 **POB:** India **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Bahaziq Mahmoud **b)** Abu Abd al-'Aziz **c)** Abu Abdul Aziz **d)** Shaykh Sahib **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Saudi Arabia~~n,~~ number 4-6032-0048-1 **Address:** ~~na~~ Saudi Arabia **Listed on:** 10 Dec. 2008 (amended on 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Financier of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (listed under permanent reference number QDe.118). Has served as the leader of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Saudi Arabia. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was

Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri ~~is~~ was an operative of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Al-Asiri ~~acts~~ acted as the principal bomb maker for AQAP~~and is currently believed to be hiding in Yemen~~.
Before joining AQAP, Al-Asiri was part of an Al-Qaida-affiliated (QDe.004) terrorist cell in Saudi Arabia and was involved in planned bombings of oil facilities in the Kingdom. In 2006, Al-Asiri was arrested by the Saudi police and imprisoned for nine months for trying to enter Iraq to join a militant group there. Upon his release, Al-Asiri attempted to create a new militant cell inside Saudi Arabia; however, police raided its meeting place and six of his colleagues were killed while he and his brother Abdullah fled to Yemen. Soon afterwards, Al-Asiri joined AQAP and has continued to engage in terrorist activity.
Al-Asiri encouraged his brother Abdullah to participate in AQAP activity. In August 2009, Abdullah carried out a suicide attack when he detonated a bomb concealed within his body with the intent to assassinate the Assistant Minister for Security Affairs of Saudi Arabia. Although the assassination attempt failed, the plot demonstrated a high level of sophistication on the part of AQAP. Ibrahim al-Asiri is credited with designing the bomb, which contained one pound of explosives. Later, AQAP released a video of Ibrahim al-Asiri and his brother Abdullah in which an AQAP commander stated that Ibrahim al-Asiri had also wanted to perpetrate a suicide attack but had to be kept behind to oversee the mission of Abdullah.
A Saudi Arabian citizen, in 2009 Al-Asiri was added to the Saudi most wanted terrorist list, and an INTERPOL Orange Notice was distributed worldwide. The notice was submitted as a global alert and as a request to locate Al-Asiri who posed a dangerous threat, concerning terrorism-related activities including but not limited to those undertaken on behalf of AQAP. Al-Asiri was reportedly deceased in 2017.

Related listed individuals and entities:
Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129), listed on 19 January 2010
Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi (QDi.282), listed on 11 May 2010
Anwar Nasser Abdulla al-Aulaqi (QDi.283), listed on 20 July 2010
Othman Ahmed Othman al-Ghamdi (QDi.292), listed on 16 June 2011

13) QDi.335 Name: 1: 'ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: KHALAF 3: 'UBAYD JUDAY' 4: AL-'ANIZI **Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Mar. 1973 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.: a)** 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-Anizi **b)** 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-'Anzi **Low quality a.k.a.: a)** Abu Usamah al-Rahman **b)** Abu Shaima' Kuwaiti **c)** Abu Usamah al-Kuwaiti **d)** Abu Usama **e)** Yusuf **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** ~~na~~ Kuwait, number 273030601222 **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in since 2013) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 15 Feb. 2017, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** A sentence of imprisonment for 15 years was issued against him by Kuwait in absentia on 30 July 2015. Provides support to Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in Syria and Iraq. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we- [illegible]

(2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

MAJEED ABDUL CHAUDHRY

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.054 MAJEED ABDUL CHAUDHRY

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
7 September 2010

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

Majeed Abdul Chaudhry was listed on **24 December 2001** pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Usama bin Laden (deceased) or the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of", "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to" or "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida ~~(QDe.004)~~ and the Taliban.

Additional information:

Majeed Abdul Chaudhry is a nuclear scientist who served as a director of Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) (QDe.068). Other directors of UTN included Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din (QDi.055) and Mohammed Tufail (QDi.056).

UTN provided Usama bin Laden (deceased) and the Taliban with information about chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In November 2001, the Taliban left Kabul and the workers at UTN's Kabul offices fled the area with them. Searches of UTN locations in Kabul yielded documents setting out a plan to kidnap a U.S. attaché and outlining basic nuclear physics related to nuclear weapons.

He reportedly died in Islamabad, Pakistan on 15 September 2006.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001
Al Rashid Trust (QDe.005), listed on 6 October 2001
WAFA Humanitarian Organization (QDe.015), listed on 6 October 2001
Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) (QDe.068), listed on 24 December 2001
Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din (QDi.055), listed on 24 December 2001
Mohammed Tufail (QDi.056), listed on 24 December 2001

15) QDi.056 Name: 1: MOHAMMED 2: TUFAIL 3: na 4: na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 May 1930 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Tufail, S.M. **b)** Tuffail, Sheik Mohammed **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Dec. 2001 (amended on 19 Jan. 2011, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Served as a director of Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) (QDe.068). Reportedly deceased. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council

Rehman f) Abdul Samad g) Samad Sial h) Abdul Samad Sial i) Ustad Talha j) Qari Mushtaq **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Tariq b) Hussain **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 22 Aug. 2011 (amended on 10 May 2012, 17 Oct. 2013, 24 Nov. 2020, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Physical description: 5 feet 2 inches; 157.4 cm. Name of father: Ali Muhammad. Mati ur-Rehman is the chief operational commander of Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096). Associated with Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130). **Reportedly deceased.** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017) was concluded on 24 November 2020. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible]

MATI UR-REHMAN ALI MUHAMMAD

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.296 MATI UR-REHMAN ALI MUHAMMAD

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
22 August 2011

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

Mati ur-Rehman was listed on **22 August 2011** pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1989 (2011) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" or "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096), Al-Qaida ~~(QDe.004)~~, and Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130).

Additional information:

Mati ur-Rehman is Lashkar i Jhangvi's (LJ) (QDe.096) chief operational commander. Mati ur-Rehman has been involved in multiple terrorist activities and is suspected of involvement in plots or attacks against a former Pakistani president and a former Pakistani prime minister, as well as against the U.S. consulate in Karachi in 2010. He has also been linked to the August 2006 plot to destroy a U.S.-bound British aircraft. In addition to leading militants seeking to carry out attacks in Pakistan, he has been involved in a militant training camp in Pakistan and, as of September 2009, was identified as a planning director for Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Mati ur-Rehman is also affiliated with Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130). Mati ur-Rehman was one of Pakistan's most wanted terrorists as of September 2009.

He was reportedly killed in Afghanistan in 2016.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096), listed on 3 February 2003

Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130), listed on 6 August 2010

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132), listed on 29 July 2011

18) QDi.408 Name: 1: ALEXANDA 2: AMON 3: KOTEY 4: na
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Dec. 1983 **POB:** London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.: a)** Alexe Kotey **b)** Alexanda Kote **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland number 094477324, issued on 5 Mar. 2005 **National identification no:** na **Address:** ~~na~~ <u>United States of America</u> **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 <u>(amended on 2 Feb. 2023)</u> **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. <u>Sentenced to life imprisonment on 29 April 2022 in the United States of America, Federal Bureau of Prisons inmate number 11685-509.</u> Physical description: eye colour: dark brown; hair colour: black; complexion: dark. Distinguishing marks: beard. Ethnic background: Ghanaian Cypriot. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible] we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

ALEXANDA AMON KOTEY

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.408 ALEXANDA AMON KOTEY

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
20 July 2017

<u>Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023</u>

Reason for listing:

Alexanda Amon Kotey was listed on 20 July 2017 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017) as being associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" and "recruiting for" the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

Additional information:

Alexanda Amon Kotey is an active fighting member of ISIL, operating in the Syrian Arab Republic. He was a member of an ISIL cell known as "the Beatles", which detained and beheaded a number of hostages in the Syrian Arab Republic, most recently in 2015. Alexanda Kotey has been involved and publicly associated himself with ISIL as one of four members of "the Beatles". As such, Alexanda Kotey is associated with the guarding and physical abuse of nationals of the United Kingdom and the United States of America as hostages and possibly murders. Media reporting indicates that Alexanda Kotey was responsible for recruiting several United Kingdom nationals to join ISIL, including Mohammed Emwazi, a.k.a Jihadi John (not listed).

<u>On 29 April 2022, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States of America.</u>

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), listed on 18 October 2004 no: na **National identification** no: na **Address:** ~~na~~ Algeria **Listed on:** 11 Jan. 2002 (amended on 18 Jul. 2007, 1 Feb. 2008, 16 May 2011, 20 Jun. 2017, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Finance chief of the Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069). Al-Qaida (QDe.004) facilitator and communication expert. Believed to be in Algeria as ~~at~~ of Apr. 2010 and May 2022. Son of Mohamed and Fatma Aribi. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

QDi.058 ~~ABU BAKR AL-JAZIRI~~ BOUBEKEUR BOULGHITI

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website: 8 July 2009

Date on which the narrative summary was updated: 2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

~~Abu Bakr al-Jaziri~~ Boubekeur Boulghiti was listed on **11 January 2002** pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Usama bin Laden and Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069).

Additional information:

~~Abu Bakr al-Jaziri~~ Boubekeur Boulghiti was the finance chief of the Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069) and also served as the head of organized fundraising for Usama bin Laden (deceased). Al-Jaziri collected funds for Al-Qaida (QDe.004) in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, through ASC. He also collected money for Al-Qaida from local nongovernmental organizations by claiming the funds were for orphans and widows. Al-Jaziri then turned the funds over to Al-Qaida operatives. In 2000, he moved from Jalalabad to Pakistan where he continued to raise and transfer funds for Al-Qaida. He was arrested in Pakistan in 2003.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069), listed on 11 January 2002

Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (QDe.070), listed on 11 January 2002

21) QDi.136 Name: 1: MOKHTAR 2: BELMOKHTAR 3: na 4: na

Name (original script): مختار بلمختار

Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jun. 1972 **POB:** Ghardaia, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Abou Abbes Khaled **b)** Belaouar Khaled Abou El Abass **c)** Belaouer Khaled Abou El Abass **d)** Belmokhtar Khaled Abou El Abes **e)** Khaled Abou El Abass **f)** Khaled Abou El Abbes **g)** Khaled Abou El Abes **h)** Khaled Abulabbas Na Oor **i)** Mukhtar Belmukhtar **Low quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Belaoua **b)** Belaour **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 11 Nov. 2003 (amended on 12 Apr. 2006, 2 Jul. 2007, 7 Apr. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011, 9 Sep. 2014, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb2023) **Other information:** **Reportedly deceased in November 2016.** Father's name is Mohamed. Mother's name is Zohra Chemkha. Member of the Council of the Organization of

Mokhtar Belmokhtar ~~is~~ was active in northern Mali and, among other crimes, was involved in the kidnap of two Canadian diplomats working for the United Nations who were abducted in December 2008.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar was reportedly killed in November 2016.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001
The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), listed on 6 October 2001
Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134), listed on 5 December 2012
Al Mouakaoune Biddam (QDe.139), listed on 2 June 2014
Al Moulathamoun (QDe.140), listed on 2 June 2014
Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141), listed on 2 June 2014
Ansar al Charia Derna (QDe.145), listed on 19 November 2014
Ansar al Charia Benghazi (QDe.146), listed on 19 November 2014
Saifi Ammari (QDi.152), listed on 4 December 2003
Kamel Djermane (QDi.167), listed on 3 May 2004
Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232), listed on 27 August 2007
Yahia Djouadi (QDi.249), listed on 3 July 2008
Amor Mohamed Ghedeir (QDi.250), listed on 3 July 2008
Salah Eddine Gasmi (QDi.251), listed on 3 July 2008
Ahmed Deghdegh (QDi.252), listed on 3 July 2008
Mohamed Belkalem (QDi.279), listed on 22 April 2010
Tayeb Nail (QDi.280), listed on 22 April 2010
Abd al-Rahman Ould Muhammad al-Husayn Ould Muhammad Salim (QDi.298), listed on 15 September 2011
Djamel Akkacha (QDi.313), listed on 5 February 2013
Mohamed Lahbous (QDi.319), listed on 24 October 2013

22) QDi.232 Name: 1: ABDELMALEK 2: DROUKDEL 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): عبد المالك دروكدال
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Apr. 1970 **POB:** Meftah, Wilaya of Blida, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 27 Aug. 2007 (amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011, 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Reportedly deceased in June 2020. Head of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment in Algeria on 21 March 2007. Father's name is Rabah Droukdel. Mother's name is Z'hour Zdigha. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 4 May 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [illegible]/View-UN-Notices-individuals.

ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL

Security Council which issued a presidential statement condemning these attacks in the strongest terms (S/PRST/2007/10 of 12 April 2007).
AQIM claimed responsibility for the 11 December 2007 attacks against the United Nations offices and the Constitutional Court building in Algiers in a statement issued on the same day. The United Nations Security Council immediately condemned the operations in the strongest terms (S/PRST/2007/45 of 11 December 2007). In his July 2008 interview with the New York Times, Droukdel again claimed responsibility for these bombings.
In August 2008, Droukdel directed the execution of three suicide-attacks that killed many civilians in the wilayat (regions) of Boumerdes, Bouira and Tizi Ouzou, Algeria.
Droukdel ~~has~~ encouraged AQIM to kidnap Algerian and foreign nationals as a way to fund its terrorist activities. The group was involved in holding two Austrian tourists abducted in February 2008 in southern Tunisia, in holding two United Nations representatives abducted in northern Niger in December 2008, and in holding four European tourists abducted in the border area between Mali and Niger in January 2009.
Droukdel was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia by the tribunal of Tizi-Ouzou, Algeria, on 27 March 2007 for his involvement in Al-Qaida-related terrorist activities.
In October 2011, Abdelmalek Droukdel wanted cover to expand the agenda of his terrorist organization into the Sahel and increase its territorial control over northern Mali. AQIM wanted to create an ostensibly independent movement that would hide its true roots by abandoning the name "Al-Qaida". AQIM suggested that the new group be led by Iyad ag Ghali (QDi.316). Since its establishment, Ansar Eddine (QDe.135) and its leader, Iyad ag Ghali, have enjoyed AQIM's continual support:

- Military support: from the battle at Aguelhok on 24 January 2012 to the offensive in early January 2013 against southern Mali, Ansar Eddine received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Malian Armed Forces, notably in the capture of the towns of Aguelhok on 24 January 2012; Tessalit on 10 March 2012; Kidal on 30 March 2012; Gao on 30 March 2012; and Timbuktu on 1 April 2012.
- Financial support: Iyad ag Ghali received a payment of 400,000 euros from one of the leaders of an AQIM brigade in the Sahel, the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.
- Logistical support: originally comprising some 50 men close to Iyad ag Ghali, Ansar Eddine has welcomed numerous AQIM fighters.

The ties between Ansar Eddine and AQIM have grown stronger since November 2012.
In November 2012, an alliance was concluded between AQIM, Ansar Eddine, and MUJAO. Offices were established north of Gao by a mission combining AQIM, Ansar Eddine and MUJAO and a common strategy was defined.
On 25 November 2012, Iyad ag Ghali expressed his support for AQIM's ideology.
Since the start of Operation Serval, Iyad ag Ghali has aligned himself with AQIM and MUJAO brigades that are fighting the French and Malian armed forces.
Abdelmalek Droukdel was reportedly killed on 3 June 2020.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001
Armed Islamic Group (QDe.006), listed on 6 October 2001
The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), listed on 6 October 2001

1

Yahia Djouadi, a.k.a. Yahia Abu Amar, ~~is~~ was the leader of the Sahel-Sahara Zone of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) (AQIM), as well as the head of the Tarek ibn Ziad group, one of AQIM's components in the Sahel-Sahara region, and ~~has~~ had his support base in northern Mali.
Since the announcement of their allegiance to Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and through their new name "the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb", the terrorist groups of this region have been attempting to consolidate their presence in the northern Sahel. With the aim of assisting Al-Qaida to achieve its objectives in the Maghreb and Sahel areas, AQIM has carried out several acts of terrorism in the region and claimed responsibility for the abduction of two Austrian tourists in southern Tunisia on 22 February 2008. The two Austrian tourists were taken to northern Mali, where Yahia Djouadi ~~is~~ was active. Yahia Djouadi was reportedly killed in Mali in February 2022.

Related listed individuals and entities:

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), listed on 6 October 2001
Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141), listed on 2 June 2014
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136), listed on 11 November 2003
Saifi Ammari (QDi.152), listed on 4 December 2003
Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232), listed on 27 August 2007
Ahmed Deghdegh (QDi.252), listed on 3 July 2008
Amor Mohamed Ghedeir (QDi.250), listed on 3 July 2008
Salah Eddine Gasmi (QDi.251), listed on 3 July 2008

24) QDi.313 Name: 1: DJAMEL 2: AKKACHA 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): جمال عكاشة
Title: na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 9 May 1978 **POB:** Rouiba, Algiers, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Yahia Abou el Hoummam b) Yahia Abou el Hammam **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 5 Feb. 2013 (amended on 1 May 2019, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information:** Father's name is Slimane. Mother's name is Akrouf Khadidja. Coordinator of groups associated with The Organisation of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) in northern Mali. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. Reportedly deceased in February 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

DJAMEL AKKACHA

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.
QDi.313 DJAMEL AKKACHA

Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:

9 September 2014
2 February 2023

Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Member of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Arrested in April 2005 in Mauritania, escaped from Nouakchott jail on 26 Apr. 2006. Re-arrested in Sep. 2008 in Mali and released on 15 Apr. 2009. Associated with Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Father's name is Leewemere. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was concluded on 21 Feb. 2019. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals

ABDERRAHMANE OULD EL AMAR

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDi.314 ABDERRAHMANE OULD EL AMAR

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
22 February 2013

Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:
9 September 2014
<u>2 February 2023</u>

Reason for listing:

Abderrahmane Ould el Amar was listed on 22 February 2013 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2083 (2012) as being associated with Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" and "recruiting for" the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134).

Additional information:

Abderrahmane Ould el Amar ~~has been~~ <u>was</u> a member of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), listed as the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014). Since 2004, Ould el Amar joined the Sahelian group Tariq Ibn Zyad led by Amor Mohamed Ghedeir (QDi.250), also known as Abdelhamid Abou Zeid. He was involved in the recruitment of new members for the benefit of this terrorist group. Arrested in April 2005 in Mauritania, he escaped from Nouakchott jail on 26 April 2006.

Ould el Amar came back to Timbuktu, Mali in December 2007 where he took part in the preparation and the planning of terrorist operations against Mauritania, and in a recruitment network for the benefit of Al Moulathamoun (QDe.140), which relies on the Organization of Al- Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). He is in close contact with Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136).

Ould el Amar was involved in the kidnapping of two French citizens in Niamey, Niger on 7 January 2011.

In December 2011, when the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134) was created, Ould el Amar took the lead of the organization.

On behalf of MUJAO, Ould el Amar claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of seven Algerian hostages in Mali and the suicide bombing against the police headquarters in Ouargala, Algeria which occurred on 29 June 2012.

Belmokhtar (QDi.136) and resulted in a split by al-Sahraoui and his followers. In October 2016, ISIL acknowledged it received a pledge of allegiance from the group under al-Sahraoui.

The group al-Sahraoui commands was is composed of fighters of Fulani, Tuareg, and Sahraoui origin. It mostly ~~targeting~~ targeted security forces in Niger and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at the border between Niger and Mali. He ~~has~~ ordered several kidnappings of foreigners, including Australian citizen Kenneth Elliot. On January 2018, the group claimed responsibility for attacks against international forces, including the Tongo Tongo attack on 4 October 2017, which led to the death of four American soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers.

Adnan Abou Walid al-Sahraoui was reportedly killed in 2021.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), listed on 18 October 2004

Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134), listed on 5 December 2012

Al-Mourabitoun (QDe.141), listed on 2 June 2014

Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136), listed on 11 November 2003

A. Entities and other groups

27) QDe.108 Name: TAIBAH INTERNATIONAL-BOSNIA OFFICES

A.k.a.: a) Taibah International Aid Agency **b)** Taibah International Aid Association **c)** Al Taibah, Intl. **d)** Taibah International Aide Association **F.k.a.:** na **Address: a)** 6 Avde Smajlovica Street, Novo Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina **b)** 26 Tabhanska Street, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina **c)** 3 Velika Cilna Ulica, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina **d)** 26 Tabhanska Street, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina **Listed on:** 11 May 2004 (amended on 24 Mar. 2009, 24 Nov. 2020, 2 Feb. 2023) **Other information: Reportedly defunct.** In 2002-2004, Taibah International – Bosnia offices used premises of the Culture Home in Hadzici, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization was officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a branch of Taibah International Aid Association under registry number 7. Taibah International – Bosnia offices ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision on cessation of operation number 03-05-2-70/03). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017) was concluded on 24 November 2020. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Entities click here

TAIBAH INTERNATIONAL-BOSNIA OFFICES

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDe.108 TAIBAH INTERNATIONAL-BOSNIA OFFICES

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:
7 April 2011

narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

QDe.109 AL-HARAMAIN & AL MASJED AL-AQSA CHARITY FOUNDATION

Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:

30 October 2009

Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:

18 June 2015

14 March 2022

2 February 2023

Reason for listing:

Al-Haramain & Al Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation was listed on **28 June 2004** pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 16 of resolution 1526 (2004) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of" Al-Qaida (QDe.004).

Additional information:

Al-Haramain & Al Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation had significant financial ties to an Al-Qaida (QDe.004) financier and provided financial support to the Bosnia-based non-governmental organization Al Furqan (QDe.107). Al-Haramain & Al Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation reportedly stopped its activities since 11 Oct 2004.

Al-Haramain & Al Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was linked to the Saudi Arabia-based Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation which presented itself as a private, charitable and educational non-governmental organization. When viewed as a single entity, Al-Haramain was one of the principal NGOs active throughout the world providing support for the Al-Qaida network. Funding generally came from individual benefactors and special campaigns which targeted selected business entities around the world.

The Al-Haramain branches in Kenya (QDe.105), Tanzania (QDe.106), Pakistan (QDe.104), Afghanistan (QDe.110), Albania (QDe.111), Bangladesh (QDe.112), Ethiopia (QDe.113), the Netherlands (QDe.114), and the Union of the Comoros (QDe.116) have provided financial, material and/or technological support to the Al-Qaida network, including Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092), Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya / AIAI (QDe.002), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). These terrorist organizations received funding from Al-Haramain and used Al-Haramain as a front for fundraising and operational activities.

Related listed individuals and entities:

Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya / AIAI (QDe.002), listed on 6 October 2001

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003), listed on 6 October 2001

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092), listed on 25 October 2002

Al-Haramain Foundation (Pakistan) (QDe.104), listed on 26 January 2004

Al-Haramayn Foundation (Kenya) (QDe.105), listed on 26 January 2004

Al Furqan (QDe.107), listed on 11 May 2004

Al-Haramain: Afghanistan Branch (QDe.110), listed on 6 July 2004

Al-Haramain: Albania Branch (QDe.111), listed on 6 July 2004

Al-Haramain: Bangladesh Branch (QDe.112), listed on 6 July 2004

Al-Haramain: Ethiopia Branch (QDe.113), listed on 6 July 2004

(QDe.092), Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya / AIAI (QDe.002), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). These terrorist organizations received funding from Al-Haramain and used Al-Haramain as a front for fundraising and operational activities.
Since 2001, Al-Haramain: the Netherlands Branch, located in Amsterdam, had been part of the larger Al-Haramain network and the networks founder was chairman of the foundation's board of directors.
In an interview with a Dutch newspaper in June 2004, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the Netherlands said that there was no doubt that Al-Haramain has had direct links to Bin Laden's terror network.
Related listed individuals and entities:
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya / AIAI (QDe.002), listed on 6 October 2001
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003), listed on 6 October 2001
Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001
Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092), listed on 25 October 2002
Al-Haramain Foundation (Pakistan) (QDe.104), listed on 26 January 2004
Al-Haramayn Foundation (Kenya) (QDe.105), listed on 26 January 2004
Al-Haramayn Foundation (Tanzania) (QDe.106), listed on 26 January 2004
Al-Haramain: Afghanistan Branch (QDe.110), listed on 6 July 2004
Al-Haramain: Albania Branch (QDe.111), listed on 6 July 2004
Al-Haramain: Bangladesh Branch (QDe.112), listed on 6 July 2004
Al-Haramain: Ethiopia Branch (QDe.113), listed on 6 July 2004
Al-Haramain Foundation (Union of the Comoros) (QDe.116), listed on 28 September 2004
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118), listed on 2 May 2005

3. Press release regarding the above can be found at https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15190.doc.htm

4. The UNSC press releases concerning amendments to the list are available at URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/press-releases

5. The latest versions of the Sanctions lists are accessible on the UN Security Council's website at the following URL:
a) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1989 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list
b) List issued by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) of individuals and entities linked to Taliban https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials

6. This information is being issued in pursuance of the instructions contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India' order F. No. 14014/01/2019/CFT, dated 2 February 2021, regarding the Procedure for implementation of Section 51A of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act,

अध्यक्ष कार्यालय
188/22
07 NOV 2022
भू-सम्पदा विनियामक प्राधिकरण
बिहार

To

The Chairman,

RERA, Bihar

REPORT REGARDING THE WORKSHOP ATTENDED ON 01.11.2022 AT VIGYAN BHAWAN, NEW DELHI

1. The Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance , Government of India has conducted a workshop with the Real Estate Regulatory Authorities of all States along with CBIC (Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs), FIU-IND (Financial Intelligence Unit – India) and Senior officials from Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs , to bring an understanding among the Real Estate Regulators, of the Money Laundering / Terrorist Financing (ML / TF) risks and vulnerabilities along with the measures to be taken by the real Estate Regulators and Professionals to manage and mitigate the risks through effective compliance measures.
2. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter -governmental body and its recommendations set an international standard, which countries should implement through measures adapted to their particular circumstances.
3. India, being a member of FATF Is scheduled to undergo mutual evaluation from May 2023 and the recommendations of FATF are to be implemented by the Countries through necessary measures. As per FATF's recommendations, appropriate steps are to be taken to manage and mitigate ML / TF risks effectively in the Real Estate Sector.
4. Govt. of India has taken steps to ensure that there is effective supervision of Real Estate Sector by enacting the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, and also notifying the Real Estate Agents under the PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act), 2002. CBIC has been notified as the AML / CFT (Anti Money Laundering / Counter Funding of Terrorism, regulator for the Real Estate Agents.
5. Under the regulatory regime of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, (RERA), the Real Restate Agents need to be registered with the concerned Real Estate Authorities. Further Agents are mandated to maintain and preserve such books of accounts, records and documents as may be prescribed and not involve themselves in unfair trade practices.
6. As per RERA Act, Real Estate Agents (REA) are intermediary between Buying and Selling of properties. REAs are gate keepers in Real Estate transactions. REA have two clients – Promoters and Buyers. To keep the records of Clients Due Diligence (CDD), KYC in Banks, Suspicious transactions, Benami ownerships, laundered money, international movement of money.
7. RERA to identify all good REAs, to report suspicious transactions, to co-ordinate Data-base at National Level of all REAs registered with RERA, to maintain QPR of REAs and to update registered REAs to Dept. of Finance and CBIC.

Nupur Banerjee, Member, RERA